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1. Introduction
The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining the existence of phenomenal
qualities in a world that is purely physical. It is possibly the most famous problem in contemporary
Philosophy of Mind, and it is often referred even in other fields. But despite receiving so much
attention, it is not clear how close we are to actually solving it. Its fame is probably proportional to
how hard it is; and it is hard.
Faced with such difficulty, many philosophers have started to explore different approaches
that could help unravel the problem. One of the possibilities that has gained a lot of traction in
recent years is the view of panpsychism., which is the idea that fundamental entities of reality have
very simple forms of consciousness. The hope is that, by establishing consciousness as something
fundamental at the base of reality, it could be much easier to explain the conscious experience of
complex beings like humans.
However, as panpsychism starts solving one problem, it creates another one: the combination
problem.  Even  if  we  assume  that  panpsychism  is  correct  and  that  fundamental  entities  are
conscious, it seems that we have no straightforward way of conceptualizing how simple conscious
beings—microsubjects—could combine into more complex ones—macrosubjects. It is common to
characterize the combination problem by saying: subjects don’t sum. This is the major problem that
contemporary panpsychism has been facing.
In this thesis I will examine panpsychism and the combination problem. I will also discuss a
solution that, as far as I can tell, has received little to no attention in the philosophical literature. It
comes from the philosopher Ken Wilber, and uses the concept of holons—wholes/parts—to think
about questions of ontology and consciousness. Unfortunately, even Wilber himself discusses his
solution very briefly. Therefore, part of my goal is to expand its application to try and deal with the
different aspects of the combination problem.
In Chapter  2, I discuss panpsychism in connection to the hard problem of consciousness. I
will  elaborate  on  what  is  precisely  the  thesis  of  panpsychism,  as  well  as  some  of  the  issues
associated with its definition. Next, I will discuss some of the arguments that have been made to
defend panpsychism, and try to summarize them in a general argument. I will also talk about some
of the classification that different types of panpsychism can have.
Chapter 3 contains an examination of the combination problem, beginning with a connection
and a parallel with the hard problem of consciousness. Then, I discuss various ways in which the
5 / 55
combination problem has been presented, depending on what aspect is taken as the focus. This will
include distinct combination problems related to subjects, to qualities, and to structures.
In Chapter  4 I explore Ken Wilber’s view and solution to the combination problem. I then
apply it to the different versions of the problem and discuss some of its implications. Next, I discuss
how Wilber’s view can be seen in terms of panpsychism classification, and examine some sources
of problems, as well as potential responses. Finally, I close the chapter by talking about a few paths
that could be fruitful for further exploration.
2. Panpsychism
In this chapter we will examine panpsychism, which is the idea that the ultimate constituents
of  reality  have  some  form of  consciousness.  I  will  begin  by  discussing  the  hard  problem  of
consciousness, followed by a definition of the panpsychist thesis, the arguments for its defense, and
a classification of the different types of panpsychism.
2.1. The hard problem of consciousness
The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining the existence of phenomenal
qualities in a world that is purely physical. In this context, when we speak of phenomenal qualities
—or simply of  qualia—we refer to the qualitative aspects of subjective experience, such as the
redness of red, for example.  Coined by the philosopher David Chalmers  (1995), the expression
‘hard  problem  of  consciousness’  became  the  contemporary  representative  of  the  mind-body
problem.
It is said to be ‘hard’ in order to distinguish it from what Chalmers  (1995) would call the
‘easy problems of consciousness’. The latter are the ones that can be solved using the standard
methods of cognitive sciences. It is not that they are actually easy—it could take us a long time to
solve them, if ever—, but that they are in principle solvable by continuing to apply similar methods
to what we have already been using. Chalmers’ seminal article sparked a lot  of discussion and
publications  by  other  philosophers.  These  in  turn  lead  Chalmers  (1997) to  further  develop his
argument as he attempted to respond to support and criticism alike.
The hard problem of consciousness is a problem that comes from trying to see how qualia
would  fit  into  a  physicalist  view.  To understand why,  on a  first  approximation  let  us  consider
physicalism as the view that all truths about reality are grounded in truths described by physics.
Physics can give structural and functional explanations about reality. But experience qua experience
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is neither functional nor structural. Therefore, physicalism can not explain subjective experience,
because truths about qualia can not be grounded in truths given by physics. 
Put  differently,  all  truths  given by physics  are  compatible  with the  absence of  subjective
experience. It is  a priori conceivable that there could exist a world that is exactly like ours, but
where subjective experience does not exist at all. However, since the physicalist description of that
world would remain the same as in ours, this means that there is something that the physicalist
description is missing.
Those arguments for the hard problem were given by Chalmers  (1995), but there had been
other previous arguments about the limits of a physicalist explanation for subjective experience,
such as the ones given by Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982) or Levine (1983). The point here is that, if
we think that those arguments are strong reasons to question the possibility of a purely physicalist
view of the world, then we are urged to find alternatives.
In the same article where he discusses the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers defends a
possible solution:
I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experience as fundamental. We know that a
theory  of  consciousness  requires  the  addition  of  something  fundamental  to  our  ontology,  as
everything in physical theory is compatible with the absence of consciousness. We might add some
entirely new nonphysical feature, from which experience can be derived, but it is hard to see what
such a feature would be like. More likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature
of the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take experience as fundamental, then
we can go about the business of constructing a theory of experience. (Chalmers 1995, 210)
Even though in that article Chalmers does not talk explicitly about panpsychism as he does in
other texts, the idea of taking experience as a fundamental part  of the world is a core tenet of
panpsychism. Instead of positing that consciousness is something completely new that ‘lights up’ at
some moment, and instead of saying that it is another substance distinct from everything else, we
simply accept consciousness as a fundamental and natural part of reality.
In the next section I will discuss in more details what is included in the panpsychist view. In
truth, the basic idea of panpsychism is much older than Chalmers’ article, and the same is true for
the mind-body problem, which has a particular expression in the hard problem of consciousness.
But it’s interesting to see that both the problem and a possible solution have a kind of a concomitant
resurgence.
2.2. The panpsychist thesis
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Panpsychism is actually not one single view, but a group of views, and each has a specific
take on the nature of the mind. For that reason, David Skrbina (2005, 2) refers to panpsychism in
general as a meta-theory. We will detail some of the different types of panpsychism in following
sections. 
However, in order to discuss the general arguments, we need to establish a working definition,
one that clearly states the thesis to be defended. That in itself is not a simple task, because of the
variety of views that can be encompassed. In addition, as Skrbina (2005) points out, the different
definitions  of  panpsychism  rely  on  other  terms  that  are  often  ambiguous  and  not  always
interchangeable,  such  as  ‘mind’,  ‘consciousness’  and  ‘experience’.  Still,  he  identifies  three
characteristics as being essential to the concept, and from them he forms a definition:
(1) Objects have experiences for themselves; that is, the mind-like quality is something internal to
or inherent in the object. (2) There is a sense in which this experience is singular; to the extent that
a structure of matter and energy that we call an object is one thing, this oneness is reflected in a
kind of unitary mental experience. (3) An object is a particular configuration of mass/energy, and
therefore any configuration or system of mass/energy should qualify in the same sense. Thus, a
functional  definition  of  panpsychism might  be  “All  objects,  or  systems  of  objects,  possess  a
singular inner experience of the world around them.” (Skrbina 2005, 16)
We can discuss each of these characteristics as playing a different role in the definition. The
first one is the basis of the panpsychist view, since the idea is to make the mental phenomena an
intrinsic part of the world. And because the mental features are taken to be intrinsic to the objects,
this distinguishes the position from other ones, such as substance dualism, for example.
The second characteristic represents two different but related questions. One is about the unity
of consciousness, that is, the fact that our experience of consciousness is always given as a unified
phenomenon. The other is that each of us has their own, unified, distinct consciousness. It makes
sense that those two features are present in his definitions since, as we will discuss in other sections,
the arguments for panpsychism usually begin with our own human experience, from which these
question are taken.
While (1) and (2) relate to the ‘psychism’ part of panpsychism, characteristic (3) relates to
‘pan’, i.e., it defines the extension to which the mental features apply in the world. Skrbina himself
admits that this third characteristic is the most contentious one. Still, he uses it for his definition
because  a priori he sees no reason to exclude any system from qualifying for the attribution of
mental  features.  However,  allowing any system to be conscious could lead to other  theoretical
problems, including conflicts with the second characteristic.
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But most importantly, it is not even necessary for panpsychism to state that all systems are
conscious.  To  include  this  characteristic  in  a  general  definition  seems  to  be  an  overstep,
contradicting certain versions of panpsychism. Strawson hints at the issue of the extension to which
mental features should be applied in a panpsychist view:
we will also need to apply our minds to the question whether the class of subjects of experience
contains only ultimates, on one hand, and things like ourselves and other whole animals, on the
other  hand,  or  whether  there are other  subjects in between,  such as  living cells.  Panpsychism
certainly does not require one to hold the view that things like stones and tables are subjects of
experience (Strawson 2006, 26)
Skrbina’s  definition  does  seem  to  be  general  enough  to  encompass  different  types  of
panpsychism. Nonetheless, it is a strong definition, and not all types of panpsychism would be in
agreement  with it.  For  that  reason,  it  would be  better  to  use a  different  definition,  one that  is
compatible  with  Skrbina’s,  but  has  a  weaker  claim.  That  would  also  mean it  is  more  open to
different sets of assumptions.
One possibility would be to use a definition such as the one David Chalmers proposes when
giving an overview of panpsychism:
we can understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical entities have mental
states. For example, if quarks or photons have mental states, that suffices for panpsychism to be
true, even if rocks and numbers do not have mental states. Perhaps it would not suffice for just one
photon to have mental states. The line here is blurry, but we can read the definition as requiring
that  all  members  of  some fundamental  physical  types  (all  photons,  for  example)  have mental
states. (Chalmers 2013, 1)
This definition differs from Skrbina’s because it is restricted in two ways. First, it is limited to
ultimate  physical  entities,  instead  of  applying  to  all  objects  and  systems  of  objects.  Second,
Chalmers restricts it even more by specifying it explicitly in terms of “some fundamental physical
entities”.
Strictly  speaking,  it  is  true  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  panpsychism that  all  fundamental
physical entities have some form of consciousness. Restricting it to some of them would be enough.
This is because, as we will see in the next section, panpsychism is trying to solve the hard problem
of consciousness by putting consciousness itself at the bottom level, so that we can get it when more
complex systems arise. 
Even if we restrict consciousness to some but not all of the fundamental entities, it could be
enough to explain the existence of more complex forms of consciousness, as long as the relevant
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type of fundamental entities are present in conscious macroentities such as humans. So since the
possibility of the existence of other non-conscious ultimate entities does not change the general
arguments for panpsychism, Chalmers’ definition is unnecessarily restricted. Therefore, using this
second restriction would only add an unnecessary complexity to the discussion.
An additional issue in these definitions is about what exactly are the features that are being
claimed to be present in fundamental entities. Skrbina uses “inner experience”, while Chalmers
talks about “mental states”. As mentioned before, the use of these terms is often ambiguous, and the
precise manner in which they appear in the definition will depend on each version of panpsychism.
That is an important and extensive discussion in itself, but for the moment we need to accept that
any choice we make will not be able to cover all the different positions. Therefore, we will use these
terms with a broader general meaning, unless otherwise specified.
With  that  in  mind,  we  establish  a  working  definition:  panpsychism  is  the  view  that
fundamental physical entities have some form of experience.
2.3. The physical in panpsychism
There is one remaining question regarding the panpsychist thesis we have just established. In
contemporary  Philosophy of  Mind,  the  revival  of  panpsychism happened  mainly  as  a  possible
solution for the hard problem of consciousness which,  as explained, is the problem of accounting
for the existence of subjective experience in a wholly physical world.
Because  of  that  starting  point,  many  contemporary  panpsychist  views  have  a  close
relationship with physicalist ideas. In this case it can be seen in our definition above, in which we
speak in terms of fundamental physical entities. The remaining question then pertains to what is the
role of the word ‘physical’ here.
To  answer  that  question,  some  distinctions  are  useful.  Strawson  (2006) distinguishes
physicalism from what he calls physicSalism. For him, physicalism is the view that every concrete
phenomena is physical, while  physicSalism is the idea that “the nature or essence of all concrete
reality can in principle be fully captured in the terms of physics” (Strawson 2006, 4). Strawson also
says that, since most people use the term ‘physicalism’ as meaning what he calls physicSalism, he
needs to use other  names for his  position,  such as ‘real physicalism’,  ‘realistic physicalism’ or
simply ‘realistic monism’.
Chalmers  (2013) makes a related point, based on the distinction between narrowly physical
properties and broadly physical properties:
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We  can  say  that  narrowly  physical properties  are  microphysical  role  properties,  such  as  the
dispositional  property  associated  with  having  a  certain  mass,  or  the  second-order  property  of
having a property that plays the mass role. We can say that broadly physical properties are physical
role properties along with any properties that realize the relevant roles: categorical bases for the
mass dispositions, first-order properties that play the mass role. (Chalmers 2013, 11, emphasis in
the original)
Through that distinction, he differentiates two notions of physicalism: “narrow physicalism,
which  holds  that  phenomenal  truths  are  grounded  in  narrowly  physical  truths,  from  broad
physicalism,  which  holds  that  phenomenal  truths  are  grounded  in  broadly  physical  truths”
(Chalmers 2013, 12). By ‘phenomenal truths’ he means truths about phenomenal properties, i.e., the
properties that characterize subjective experience.
Chalmers’  concept  of  narrow  physicalism relates  closely  with  Strawson’s  idea  of
physicSalism.  Physics  is  taken  to  cover  at  least1 truths  about  narrowly  physical  properties.
Therefore, to say that physicSalism is true (physics can capture all truths about concrete reality) is
roughly equivalent to saying that narrow physicalism is true (phenomenal truths are grounded in
narrowly physical truths).
With that in mind, we can now discuss the role the term ‘physical’ plays in our definition of
panpsychism. The question we face with that usage is twofold: first, what we mean by ‘fundamental
physical  entities’;  second,  whether  we  would  be  better  off  simply  talking  about  ‘fundamental
entities’.
Panpsychism  is  a  possible  solution  for  the  hard  problem  of  consciousness.  However,  if
physicSalism—or narrow physicalism—is true then panpsychism is unnecessary. Therefore, when
we talk about ‘physical’ in the context of panpsychism, we can not be simply referring to what
physics tells us about the fundamental nature of reality. What then?
The term ‘physical’ here is playing two roles. First, it is establishing a type of monism. Just as
in  the  argument  above,  if  substance  dualism2 is  true,  then  panpsychism is  unnecessary—even
though  the  two  are  not  strictly  incompatible.  So,  when  we  speak  of  physical  entities  for
panpsychism, we are implying that there is only one type of  stuff in the world,  that is,  we are
1 I say ‘at least’ because there is a parallel question here on whether or not physics even require broadly physical
properties,  i.e.,  quiddities.  However,  that  does  not  affect  the  discussion  at  this  point,  because  we  are  only
establishing a link between the concepts of ‘narrow physicalism’ and ‘physicSalism’.
2 Substance dualism is understood here as the general claim that mind and matter are two distinct substances.
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implying monism. Second, we are saying that those entities are of the same nature as to what we
usually refer when we point to chairs and tables, for example3.
But if that is all we mean by ‘physical’, would it be better if we just used a more general
wording, as when Strawson talks about ‘realistic monism’? If we just talked about fundamental
entities without any mention of ‘physical’, our definition of panpsychism would be simplified. The
drawback would be that we would risk losing some clarity for the definition. Without a reference to
the physical, we could be getting too close to idealism4, for example.
In a sense, the choice is not that important, as long as we are clear about what is implied.
However, there is one last reason that makes me believe it is better to not use ‘physical’ in our
definition. In contemporary panpsychism we are often coming from a physicalist point of view and
bringing with us plenty of assumptions about its ontology, and those can get mixed up easily. That
will become clearer when we start discussing the combination problem.
Besides, it is common to refer to atoms as examples of fundamental entities in the discussion,
and for the sake of simplicity we will  do the same. So even if  we remove ‘physical’ from the
definition,  it  will  never  be  far  from  the  discussion.  But  here  atoms  will  merely  serve  as
placeholders. What we actually refer to are the fundamental entities—the ultimate constituents or
simply ‘ultimates’—, that is, whatever entities that happen to be fundamental in the structure of
reality.
The  result,  then,  is  that  we  can  update  our  definition:  panpsychism  is  the  view  that
fundamental entities have some form of experience.
2.4. Arguments for panpsychism
We have discussed how the hard problem of consciousness might motivate us to look for
alternative solutions such as panpsychism. An important issue to keep in mind is that, as mentioned
previously, panpsychism is not a single theory, but can be viewed as a meta-theory. Looking at the
many versions of panpsychism that appeared throughout the history of philosophy, Skrbina (2005)
identifies over 10 distinct types of arguments that have been given in its defense. Although many of
3 We are assuming, as discussed in our definition, that all ultimate entities have some form of consciousness. It could
be the case that only some of the ultimate entities are conscious, and that the entities that form tables and chairs are
not of that type. In that case, we would need extra examples to include conscious entities. The point here is simply
to say that we are not talking about some out of the ordinary type of entity.
4 This, of course, is not necessarily something bad in itself. Chalmers tells the story about how he heard someone
saying that “One starts as a materialist, then one becomes a dualist, then a panpsychist, and one ends up as an
idealist” (forthcoming, 1). Maybe this is part of that path. However, it’s important not to blur the lines too much if
we hope to limit our discussion around panpsychism.
12 / 55
those  arguments  are  not  necessarily  convincing,  especially  in  the  context  of  contemporary
philosophy, there are some that deserve special attention.
From the arguments Skrbina (2005, sec. 10.1) presents, the ones that can be highlighted as the
most relevant are:  the argument from continuity5, which relies on the idea of a common principle
that exists in all things; the argument from non-emergence, which rejects the possibility of mental
features  emerging  from  non-mental  ones;  the  naturalized  mind  argument,  which  emphasizes
panpsychism’s  advantage  to  integrate  mind  into  the  natural  world;  and  the  last  man  standing
argument, which is a type of a negative argument, stating that because all other alternative theories
have failed, panpsychism gains more credibility.
2.4.1. Interlocking arguments
The types of arguments mentioned above are stronger when given in combination with each
other,  in  interlocking  and  more  fully  developed  arguments.  One  interesting  feature  of  such
interlocking arguments is that many of them seem to work through the rejection of either other
positions or routes that seem troublesome. Chalmers  (2013), for example, gives what he calls a
dialectical  argument,  where  the  thesis  is  materialism—which  we  will  call  ‘physicalism’,  for
consistency—, the antithesis is dualism, and the synthesis is panpsychism.
For the rejection of the thesis of physicalism, Chalmers applies a conceivability argument
similar to what we briefly discussed for the hard problem of consciousness. The basic idea is as
follow. Let us say that we have all truths given by physics on one hand, and some truth about
mental phenomena on the other. It is conceivable that the first could exist while the latter is absent
at the same time. Because it is conceivable, one can argue it is metaphysically possible, which in
turn would entail that physicalism is false.
This leads Chalmers to the antithesis of dualism. Against dualism and in favor of physicalism,
he uses what he calls the causal argument. This argument relies on two ideas: first, that everything
that is causally relevant for a physical event can be fully explained in physical terms; second, that
mental phenomena is causally relevant for physical events. It follows, then, that mental phenomena
can be fully explained in physical terms, which means that physicalism is true and, as a corollary,
that dualism is false.
With the rejection of both physicalism and dualism, Chalmers defends that panpsychism can
then serve as the synthesis, “as a view that captures the virtues of both views and the vices of
5 Skrbina names this ‘the argument by continuity’ when enumerating all of the arguments, but in other places he calls
it ‘the argument from continuity’. I chose to list it as the latter.
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neither”  (2013,  2).  Specifically,  he  believes  that  a  particular  type  of  panpsychism,  constitutive
Russellian panpsychism,  is  the view that can deal with the problems faced by physicalism and
dualism. In the next section we will discuss the different types of panpsychism.
Arguments against physicalism and dualism have been debated at length in the philosophical
literature, and it is not in the scope of this work to rehash them. Each has multiple premises, explicit
as well as hidden ones, and the discussion around those premises lead to many forking paths. What
is  important  here  is  that,  by  rejecting  both  physicalism  and  dualism,  Chalmers  arrives  at
panpsychism as the possible alternative. This displays features of the arguments Skrbina mentions.
The rejection of physicalism has implicitly rejected a version of emergence of the mental
from non-mental, and this of course is the argument from non-emergence. The rejection of dualism,
on the other hand, relates indirectly to the argument from continuity, for it avoids creating a split
between the mental and the physical. Finally, the establishment of panpsychism as the synthesis ties
back to both the naturalized mind argument and the last man standing argument.
Strawson  (2006) also gives a defense of panpsychism that displays some of these types of
arguments,  especially  the  argument  from  non-emergence.  As  explained  previously,  Strawson
distinguishes  between  physicSalism and real  physicalism.  PhysicSalism is  the  idea  the  physics
covers all truths about reality, while real physicalism (RP) states that every concrete phenomenon is
physical.
Strawson begins  with the idea that  consciousness  is  a  concrete  phenomena,  which in  RP
means it is physical. We are all aware of our own human consciousness, so he takes experience to
be an indubitable starting point in RP, for “experience is itself the fundamental given natural fact”
(Strawson 2006, 4). By saying that, he is doing two things: one, he is avoiding some paths in which
consciousness  is  excessively  deflated  or  even  dismissed  as  unreal;  two,  he  is  saying  that
consciousness has to be put in the natural order of the world as any other phenomena. Here we can
see the basic assumptions for both the argument from continuity and the naturalized mind argument.
However,  the core of Strawson’s defense is  related to  the argument from non-emergence.
First,  he  states  that  in  what  people  usually  call  physicalism  there  is  an  assumption  that  is
unwarranted,  namely  that  the  fundamental  basis  of  the  physical  world  is  completely  non-
experiential  (NX6).  He  believes  that  this  assumption  is  not  only  unnecessary,  but  actually  not
defensible if one accepts the basic ideas in real physicalism.
6 Strawson names the non-experiental assumption as ‘NE’, but I’m going to use ‘NX’ to avoid confusing ‘NE’ with
non-emergence
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Strawson defends that if one tries to put the assumptions of NX and RP together, the only way
to get consciousness is to appeal to a sort of emergence. However, the type of emergence required to
get the experiential—i.e.,  consciousness—from the non-experiential would be too big a leap. In
weaker cases of emergence—such as the liquidity of water, for example—, there is a graspable and
intuitive sense of what is happening, as well as a type of reduction without remainder. For the case
of consciousness, though, that would not be the case, because what would be required is a type of
brute emergence, which is unacceptable.
We can now summarize  his  entire  argument  as  follows.  From RP we have that,  because
consciousness is a concrete phenomena, it is therefore physical. If NX is true, we need a type of
brute  emergence in  order  to  explain consciousness.  But emergence can not  be brute.  The only
option, then, is to reject the premise of NX. Therefore, panpsychism is true.
Coleman (2006) defends that in order to arrive at the conclusion that Strawson does, there are
two important assumptions that are needed, which he calls  smallism and  perspicuity. Smallism is
the  idea  that  all  facts  about  reality  are  grounded  in  facts  about  the  smallest  entities,  i.e.,  the
fundamental entities. Perspicuity, in turn, is the view that the determination of facts of higher-level
entities from the facts of lower-level ones is, in principle, knowable a priori.
Smallism is, according to Coleman, first a metaphysical issue, and only afterwards it becomes
an epistemological one. He says that this is the basis where many philosophers apply the idea of
supervenience.  Coleman also believes it  is understandable that Strawson assumes it,  given how
pervasive it is in the philosophy of mind, especially among physicalists. This assumption shows up
particularly in the way Strawson argues about how we would need a type of brute emergence in
order to get experiential features from non-experiential ones.
However, Coleman defends that it is possible to hold both NX and RP if one rejects smallism,
for example in a macro non-reductive physicalism. Such a view rejects the idea that higher levels
are determined by the lowest level, even if there are in fact levels of reality. In this case, each level
could be autonomous with regards to how its properties are determined. For consciousness, this
would mean that maybe it accompanies a certain level of complexity of reality, but does not emerge
out of it. Coleman says it would be a type of brute accompaniment and not of brute emergence.
Because of that, it would avoid this specific objection from Strawson.
This leads us to the second assumption, perspicuity. While smallism is more of a metaphysical
assumption, perspicuity is an epistemological one. It is not enough to be committed to smallism in
order to apply Strawson’s argument, because one could say that even though the facts about the
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lowest levels determine the facts about the higher levels, it would not be possible to see  a priori
how that determination works. This means that NP and NX could work together if one gives up on
the idea of knowing—even from ‘God’s point of view’—how the experiential emerges out of the
non-experiential.
This, of course, does not mean that Strawson’s argument does not hold. It simply means that
there are more assumptions needed, and that there is no need to commit to panpsychism if you are
willing to give up on one of those assumptions. Coleman himself thinks that these assumptions are
true, but also that they can not be taken for granted without argument.
2.4.2. A general argument for panpsychism
The exposed arguments are a few examples of how panpsychism can and has been defended,
and how the interlocking parts—assumptions and arguments—play a role in this. With those in
mind, we can now summarize a general version of an argument for panpsychism:
(1) Consciousness is real.
(2) Consciousness is causally relevant.
(3) Reality is made of one type of stuff.
(4) The type of stuff reality is made of is physical, i.e., the same as tables and chairs.
(5) Facts about reality are determined by facts about the smallest entities.
(6) To get experience out of non-experience it would require a type of brute emergence.
(7) Emergence can’t be brute.
(8) From (1)–(7), panpsychism is true.
Let us go through each one: (1) is what is assumed in real physicalism, and a rejection of
eliminativism; (2) is required for the causal argument, and a rejection of epiphenomenalism; (3) is
related to the argument from continuity, but also comes from the rejection of dualism given by the
causal argument; (4) is also a basis for real physicalism and, as explained in the section about the
role of the physical in panpsychism, a type of monism and a rejection of strict idealism; (5) is
smallism, also indirectly related to the argument from continuity; (6) and (7) are both perspicuity
and  non-emergence,  and  ultimately  a  rejection  of  physicSalism.  If  all  these  assumptions  are
accepted, we conclude that panpsychism is true.
2.5. Types of panpsychism
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As we have reiterated, panpsychism is not a single theory, but can be thought of as a group of
theories or even as a meta-theory. This means that its common and general features are not enough
to pin down the view. So far we have been dealing with panpsychism without discussing some
specific claims, particularly about the nature of the mind.
As with many philosophical taxonomies, the different views do not always fit perfectly within
the bounds of some categories. However, it is possible to use axes with which the theories can be
roughly classified. The two axes we will discuss are: constitutive vs non-constitutive panpsychism;
and Russellian vs non-Russellian panpsychism.
2.5.1. Constitutive and non-constitutive panpsychism
The categorization of a panpsychist theory as constitutive or non-constitutive depends on how
it understands the relation between microexperiences and macroexperiences. A microexperience is
the  experience  that  a  fundamental  entity  has,  that  is,  the  experience  of  microentities.  A
macroexperience,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  type  of  experience  that  macroscopic  entities  have,
entities such as human beings and any other entity that is not a fundamental one.
Constitutive panpsychism is the view that microexperiences constitute macroexperiences. This
view  relates  to  the  smallism  assumption  that  Coleman  (2006) describes,  in  which  the
macroproperties are grounded in the microproperties. Chalmers  (2013) states that the relation of
constitution can be one of partial grounding—as opposed to complete grounding—, if one believes
that  only  certain  aspects  of  macroexperiences  are  grounded  in  microexperiences,  for  example
regarding structural  or  functional  properties.  The constitutive  type  of  panpsychism can also be
related to a more mereological discussion, for example in the version that Luke Roelofs (2019) calls
combinationism.
It is commonly accepted that macrophysical properties are grounded in microphysical ones. In
this type of panpsychism, the same thing is thought about the relation between macroexperiences
and  microexperiences.  In  this  sense,  this  view  keeps  the  features  that  one  would  expect,  for
example, in a defense of panpsychism that uses arguments such as the one from continuity and the
naturalized mind argument.
In  contrast  to  the  constitutive  type  there  is  also  non-constitutive  panpsychism.  For  non-
constitutive  panpsychism  the  relation  between  macro  and  microexperiences  is  not  one  of
constitution. Usually the proposed relation in this case is one of emergence, which is why it is
sometimes called emergentist panpsychism.
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The appearance of emergence in panpsychism could create some worry, especially given that
the argument from non-emergence is sometimes central in the defense of panpsychism. The stronger
the emergence required for  the theory to  work,  the less one can rely on the argument  of non-
emergence. However, even if we talk about emergence, there is still leeway in the definition of the
type of emergence, which means it does not need to be the same type of brute emergence that
Strawson (2006) criticizes.
2.5.2. Russellian and non-Russellian panpsychism
For  the  second  axis  of  classification  we  have  the  contrast  between  Russellian  and  non-
Russellian panpsychism. This is related to a view about the intrinsic nature of matter,  which is
usually  associated  with  the  philosopher  Bertrand  Russell—hence  the  name.  The  idea  is  that
although physics can tell us what matter does, it is unable to tell us what matter is. In other words,
although we can know empirically about the extrinsic nature of reality, our theories seem to have a
hole where the intrinsic natures—the fundamental categorical properties, the quiddities—should be.
Russellian panpsychism is a way of trying to solve the problem of intrinsic nature at the same
time as it solves the hard problem of consciousness. Because of this feature, it can be used as an
argument, what Roelofs (2019) calls the intrinsic natures argument for panpsychism. On one hand,
panpsychism is trying to find a suitable place for macroexperiences, which in turn are connected to
microexperiences,  that  is,  the  basic  phenomenal  qualities.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a
philosophical problem with the hole where intrinsic natures should be. In Russellian panpsychism,
microexperiences  are  taken  to  be  precisely  that  intrinsic  nature.  Here,  the  basic  phenomenal
qualities—attributed to fundamental entities—are actually the intrinsic nature that plays the role of
the  properties  that  physics  investigates.  Put  differently,  in  Russellian  panpsychism  the
microexperiences are what matter is; physics then investigates what it does.
Finally,  there  is  non-Russellian  panpsychism.  For  this  type  of  panpsychism,  the
microexperiences can be seen as being side by side with physical properties. This can be interpreted
as a type of property dualism, which is why Roelofs (2019) calls it ‘dualistic’ panpsychism. Many
philosophers (Chalmers 2013; Roelofs 2019; Goff 2007) believe that this is a more problematic type
of panpsychism, which is  why they usually  prefer  to  focus on the Russellian type.  One of the
reasons is that non-Russellian panpsychism seems to be particularly vulnerable to objections such
as the causal argument, which we explained as one of the arguments used to defend panpsychism.
However, a non-Russellian type of panpsychism could still be defensible if one finds alternative
arguments to defend panpsychism, rather than relying on the causal argument.
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2.5.3. Panprotopsychism
Panprotopsychism is a view that is usually discussed together with panpsychism. Even though
it  will  not  be  a  part  of  the  focus  of  this  thesis,  I  would  like  to  mention  it  for  the  sake  of
completeness. Goff (2009) describes the view:
The panprotopsychist  adds protophenomenal properties  to the physical  facts.  Protophenomenal
properties are ‘hidden’ properties of physical ultimates – hidden in the sense of being empirically
indiscernible – which, although not themselves phenomenal properties, in certain combinations
come together to constitute conscious experience. (Goff 2009, 292)
As can be seen,  panprotopsychism takes an approach similar  to that  of panpsychism, but
instead of establishing phenomenal properties as fundamental, it uses protophenomenal ones. We
can raise the question of whether  this  would actually be a  distinct  view, or if  it  would simply
collapse into either panpsychism or physicalism. Chalmers (2013, 16) defends that there are enough
reasons to think that panprotopsychism can be seen as a distinct view, even if it is susceptible to
some of the same criticisms that are directed towards panpsychism and physicalism.
3. The combination problem
Arguments such as the ones explained in the previous sections might suffice for us to take
panpsychism into serious consideration as a solution to the hard problem of consciousness. But
even though panpsychism has its promises, it also faces a very specific roadblock: the combination
problem.  The combination  problem is  the  problem of  explaining  the  existence  of  higher  order
consciousness, if one accepts that panpsychism is true. It has been the focal point of many of the
contemporary research about panpsychism, for example with Goff (2009), Mørch (2014), Chalmers
(2016), Miller (2018), and Roelofs (2019).
The name ‘combination problem’ was coined by William Seager  (1995),  but  the problem
seems to have been first pointed out by William James: 
Where the elemental  units are supposed to be feelings,  the case is  in no wise altered.  Take a
hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that may
mean);  still  each  remains  the  same  feeling  it  always  was,  shut  in  its  own  skin,  windowless,
ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there,
if, when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as
such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings
might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they
would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one
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from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they  evolved it.  (James 1890, 160, italics
original)
James also characterizes the problem in an example where you suppose that there is a group
of people, each thinking of a word. No matter how you put those people together or how hard each
one thinks of the word, James says, the combination of the consciousness of the words will never
form the  consciousness  of  a  sentence.  In  the  book,  this  is  discussed  in  a  section  called  ‘Self-
compounding of mental facts is inadmissible’, which indicates how strongly he believed the idea
was problematic. In his own words, “the private minds do not agglomerate into a higher compound
mind” (James 1890, 160).
As mentioned, the combination problem is the problem of explaining the existence of higher
order consciousness, even if we are willing to accept that panpsychism is true. If panpsychism is
true, the fundamental entities of reality have some form of consciousness. But the starting point and
one of the eventual goals of the philosophical discussion about consciousness is to explain our own,
human consciousness. As Philip Goff (2009) puts it:
Whilst it is of course true that panpsychism gives an account of the presence of consciousness in
reality, in the sense that it supposes that physical ultimates are conscious, what we require out of a
theory  of  consciousness  is  not  just  a  theory  that  explains  the  presence  of  any old  conscious
experience in our world.  What we want  explained is  our conscious experience,  the conscious
experience that corresponds to humans and other organisms. (Goff 2009, emphasis original)
So the question is: how is it that we can get higher-order consciousness—such as that of a
human—from conscious fundamental entities? To accept that fundamental entities are conscious
does not seem to immediately imply that, when those entities are put together, they would combine
to form a unified higher-order consciousness.
3.1. The hard problem and the combination problem
The  combination  problem shares  a  feature  with  the  hard  problem of  consciousness,  and
understanding that similarity can be helpful. As previously mentioned, one of the arguments behind
the hard problem of consciousness is based on conceivability, as pointed out by Chalmers (1995). It
is  conceivable,  the argument  goes,  that  there could be a  universe in which all  truths given by
physics are the same as in ours, but where no consciousness exists. Because this is conceivable, it
seems that something is missing in the physicalist picture of reality.
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A similar argument can be created against panpsychism, which is what Seager  (1995) uses
when defining the combination problem. Against physicalism, we underline the conceivability of
physics  without  consciousness.  Now  let  us  assume  that  panpsychism  is  true.  Even  if  every
fundamental particle is conscious, it is still conceivable that no combination of particles would lead
to a higher-order consciousness, including the combination that is found in human brains. In other
words, just as we can not seem to get consciousness from physics, we seem unable to get macro-
consciousness from micro-consciousness.
Seager (1995) refers to the hard problem of consciousness as ‘the generation problem’, since
it is about “explaining why and how experience is generated by certain particular configuration of
physical stuff” (W. Seager 1995, 272). He explains that panpsychism suffers from the same issue: 
the  combination  problem points  to  a  distinctive  generation  problem in  panpsychism which  is
formally analogous to the problem of generating consciousness out of matter. Panpsychism will
have no advantage over physicalism if essentially the same problem lurks at its  heart,  and, of
course, it faces the intrinsic implausibility of asserting that atoms are conscious (W. Seager 1995,
281)
A similar point is made by Chalmers  (2016, sec. 7.4.3) in what he calls  the conceivability
argument.  For the argument, let ‘PP’ be all  facts about reality at  the microscopic scale,  that is,
microphysical and microphenomenal facts, and let ‘Q’ be a macrophenomenal fact, such as ‘some
human being is conscious’. Chalmers then sets up these premises: “(1) PP&~Q is conceivable. (2) If
PP&~Q is conceivable,  it  is  metaphysically possible.  (3) If  PP&~Q is metaphysically possible,
constitutive  panpsychism is  false”  (Chalmers  2016,  187).  The conclusion,  from (1)-(3),  is  that
constitutive panpsychism is false.
In  that  argument,  Chalmers  (2016) focuses  on  constitutive  panpsychism—the  idea  that
microconsciousness constitute macroconsciousness—, which he takes to be the most important type
of  panpsychism.  Such  a  focus  is  also  understandable  because  it  can  be  harder  to  construct
arguments against the theory without being specific. But as he alludes  (Chalmers 2016, 185), the
argument could in principle be applied generally against panpsychism.
Chalmers  also  makes  the  connection  with  the  argument  for  the  hard  problem  of
consciousness,  saying that  “premises  (2)  and (3)  are  parallel  to  corresponding premises  in  the
familiar conceivability argument against physicalism” (Chalmers 2016, 187). It is premise (1) that
is different. However, there is still a connection that can be seen in it.
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In  the  conceivability  argument  against  physicalism one  can  use  the  idea  of  experiential
zombies.  An  experiential  zombie  is  a  perfect  microphysical  duplicate of  a  human  being,  for
example, but one that does not have any experience at all. The behavior of an experiential zombie
might be exactly the same as the human—since it is physically identical—, but there is no what it is
like  to  be the  zombie,  that  is,  ‘the  lights  are  out’.  And  in  a  sense  it  is  the  conceivability  of
experiential zombies that is at the core of such argument against physicalism.
Similarly, one could talk about zombies in the context of panpsychism. But this would be a
different type of zombie, one that Goff (2009) calls microexperiential zombies and Chalmers (2016)
calls  panpsychist zombies. A panpsychist zombie is a higher-order zombie. On one hand, it is not
only a perfect microphysical duplicate, but also a microexperiential duplicate. Put differently, both
the microphysical and the microexperiential facts are identical to those of a regular human being.
On the other hand, the panpsychist zombie lacks a higher-order consciousness. All its microphysical
constituents might be conscious as per panpsychism, but it is conceivable that the entity as a whole
could be non-conscious. 
Chalmers  (2016, 188) says that the panpsychist zombie is what is being asserted in premise
(1) discussed above, where PP&~Q is conceivable. And just as in the argument against physicalism,
because this possibility is conceivable even if one accepts panpsychism, it indicates that there is
something that the theory is missing.
3.2. Aspects of the combination problem
So far we have been discussing the general version of the combination problem. There are,
however, aspects of it that can be distinguished as specific problems in themselves. In a sense, even
the  conceivability  argument  can be seen as  one  of  those that  can be  classified  as  combination
problems. Chalmers (2016) gives an extended description of multiple versions of the combination
problem. He describes three general aspects:
The combination problem can be broken down into at least three subproblems, reflecting three
different  aspects  of  phenomenal  states:  their  subjective  character (they  are  always  had  by  a
subject),  their  qualitative  character (they  involve  distinctive  qualities),  and  their  structural
character (they have a certain complex structure). (Chalmers 2016, 182, emphasis mine)
These aspects—as well as the further subdivisions of them—can also be turned into more
formal  arguments  against  panpsychism,  something  that  is  done  both  by  Chalmers  (2016) and
Roelofs (2019) in their exposition. On top of Chalmers’ grouping and description of these aspects,
Coleman (2016, sec. 10.1) classifies the different combination problems in two ways:
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Objections  to  a  theory  of  mind that  flow from its  fit  with  our  best  science  I  call  ‘bridging
problems’— they are difficulties around our building a bridge between a given theory of mentality
and our scientific theories of the brain and physical world. The [other] [...] sort of objection are
‘internal problems’— they are difficulties alleged to afflict a theory of mind taken on its own
terms, or within the field of theories of mind. (Coleman 2016, 251, bold mine)
What follows is a discussion—using Chalmers’ grouping and Coleman’s categorization—of
the  different  aspects  of  the  combination  problem,  as  well  as  how  they  highlight,  within  the
combination problem, the issues that a panpsychist theory needs to be able to handle in order to be
successful.
3.2.1. Subjects combination problem
The combination problem regarding subjects is possibly the closest to the general version of
the combination problem as described above. The subjectivity aspect of the combination problem is
the problem of explaining how it is that microsubjects can combine and give rise to a macrosubject.
On this, Roelofs (2019) says:
The simplest argument against combinationism [(i.e., Roelofs’ version of panpsychism)] is that
“subjects don’t  sum”: knowing what it’s like to be each of some collection of subjects seems
impotent to tell us anything about what it’s like to be  someone else. And since the whole they
compose is not any one of them, it seems to be an example of “someone else” (Roelofs 2019, 54,
italics original)
 Chalmers (2016, sec. 7.3) calls this the subject summing problem, and says that it can be seen
as an extension of William James’ example where 100 subjects do not entail an additional subject.
But we can conceive the problem in a slightly different manner, because there is a sense in which it
seems that each of the subjects is closed up onto itself, and no matter how close they are to each
other, “still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant
of what the other feelings are and mean” (James 1890, 160).
In  Coleman’s  (2016) classification,  the  subject  summing  problem  is  internal  because  “it
concerns our concept of a subject and whether subjects could constitute another subject” (Coleman
2016, 251). But within the combination problem with regards to subjects, Coleman makes a further
distinction, saying that there is a negative and a positive version of it. The subject summing problem
is the negative problem, for it is actually an explanatory gap of how to entail macrosubjects from a
group of microsubjects (Coleman 2016, 254).
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The positive version of the subject combination problem would be what Chalmers  (2016)
calls the unity problem. In Coleman’s (2016) view, while the negative version is an explanatory gap,
the positive version is “a genuine metaphysical stumbling block or apparent  impossibility:  How
could you hope to produce a phenomenally unified,  single-perspective,  subject by assembling a
group of subjects each of which essentially has its own perspective?” (Coleman 2016, 255, italics
original).
This  problem is  also discussed by Roelofs  (2019, sec.  2.3.2),  in  which he points  out  the
possibility of a fragmented zombie, that is, one whose experience is not unified. He says:
the experience of a single composite subject must be unified in a way that  contrasts with the
apparent separateness  of experiences had by different subjects.  And yet  if  the whole gets one
experience from one part, and another from another part, surely their experiences will be spread
out across subjects rather than unified. And on the face of it this will be true whatever the character
of those experiences, and however those parts are related. We know conscious unity as a within-
subject  relation, something connecting the many experiences  within one subject’s phenomenal
field. We do not know how to see it as, or even relate it to, a between-subjects relation, holding
between two or more different subjects. Hence, we cannot see what relation among component
subjects and their experiences could suffice to unify them. (Roelofs 2019, 55)
In summary, the unity problem highlights the difficulty of establishing a panpsychist view in
which the relations between microsubjects and their  microexperiences can be thought in a way
where the resulting macrosubject would have a unified macroexperience.
A related problem is the  boundary problem, which Chalmers  (2016) says that comes from
Rosenberg (1998). The boundary problem is one that is not restricted to panpsychism, but can be
generally described as the difficulty of explaining how it is that consciousness can have a clear
boundary. In the context of panpsychism, it can be seen as the flip side of the unity problem. While
in the unity problem there is a worry about the unification of the experience of microsubjects, in the
boundary problem the question is about the relation between bounded microexperiences and their
resulting bounded macroexperience.
Roelofs (2019) sees the boundary problem as being connected to another problem, in what he
calls the incompatibility contexts argument. On example that use uses to explain it is:
consider the experience of seeing blue side by side with red; the red here appears as limited by and
contrasting with the blue (and vice versa). If some part of me is experiencing the red alone, does it
experience it the same way I do (as limited by and contrasting with another color), or not? If the
former,  surely that  experience implies also experiencing the blue;  if  the latter,  surely that is  a
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different  experience of  red  from the one  I  am having.  Either  way,  we do not  get  substantive
experiential combination into a composite subject with unified consciousness. (Roelofs 2019, 58)
We can interpret Roelofs  (2019) as pointing to the idea that if two microexperiential parts
compose a macroexperiential whole, then the parts either: (1) lose their boundaries, which means
that  they  have  the  same experience  of  the  whole;  (2)  keep their  boundaries,  which  means the
experiences  that  the  whole  inherits  from  the  parts  are  not  the  same  as  the  parts  themselves
experience them. Both options seem to be problematic, which if why Roelofs (2019) describes this
as a dilemma.
There is a final and related problem that is discussed by Roelofs (2019) in the context of what
he  calls  the  privacy argument,  and it  is  the result  of  putting  together  some assumptions  about
composite subjectivity. The first assumption is that at least some experiences had by a macrosubject
has to be also present in its component microsubjects. The second, that experiences are essentially
subjective. And the third, that an experience that is essentially subjective can only belong to one
subject,  but  not  to  other,  i.e.,  it  is  private.  The  problem,  then  is  explaining  how  it  is  that  a
microexperience can be private to a microsubject, at the same time as it is had by a macrosubject.
3.2.2. Qualities combination problem
This group of problems refers to the combination of phenomenal qualities,  that is,  of the
qualitative  aspects  of  experience.  Under  panpsychism,  we  can  consider  that  microsubjects  are
experiencing microqualities. While the subjects combination problem focuses on the microsubjects,
the qualities combination problem focuses on the microqualities. The simplest way of putting it is:
how do microqualities combine to create macroqualities?
One specific version of this problem is what Chalmers (2016) call the palette problem. This
problem is particularly pressing under Russellian versions of panpsychism, because in these the
qualities of experience are taken to be the intrinsic nature of matter. But matter at a fundamental
level seems to have only a limited set of properties that are expressed, for example, in a limited
number  of  fundamental  particles.  So  for  Russellian  panpsychism  the  intrinsic  nature  of  those
particles would be equality limited in number. The palette problem is: how is it that a limited set of
microqualities can give rise to such a huge array of different macroqualities we experience?
Coleman  (2016) considers  the  palette  problem to  be a  bridging problem,  because it  only
appears given the requirement of connecting microqualities with microphysical properties, which is
done under Russellian panpsychism. He explains:
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The  reason  there  are  only  a  few  microqualities  is  that  Chalmers  makes  the  microqualities
isomorphic with microphysical properties, of which there are apparently only a handful. So the
problem is: we want to make microqualities isomorphic with microphysical properties; that means
only a few microqualities, so how do they generate masses of macroqualities? With the tie to
physics  removed  this  problem  would  be  considerably  less  impressive:  without  the  limited
repertoire  of  microphysical  properties  we’d  have  no  reason  not  to  indulge  in  masses  of
microqualities.
In contrast, there are versions of the problem of qualities combination that are internal. One
such problem is  what  Coleman  (2016) calls  the  production  problem,  and  it  is  the  problem of
developing a model that explains how two different qualities could in principle combine. Coleman
(2016, 252) gives the following example: suppose there are two instances of qualities, one of the
color red and one of the color white. How could two separate instances of qualities give rise to a
third instance of quality, for example of the color pink?
This also relates to another internal version of the problem, which Coleman (2016) calls the
contamination problem and which he attributes to Lucretius. Coleman says:
So even if we can get past the production problem, and understand how separately instantiated
qualities could interact to combine, we have an arguably more basic problem, of understanding
how qualities  that  can  combine  actually  do  so.  What  does  it  even  mean for  two qualities  to
constitute a quality? Pink isn’t red, and it isn’t white either. One might expect that for red and
white to survive in combination we would get as product  a patch of red alongside a patch of
white. (Coleman 2016, 252, italics original)
A further quality problem discussed by Coleman (2016) is the incommensurability problem,
which he believes makes the contamination problem even harder. The problem is about explaining
what kind of basic set of qualities could be general enough so that in one combination they would
give rise to smells, in another to colors, and in yet another to pain. Such experiences seem too
different to be just combinations of the same set of microqualities. Although similar to the palette
problem, Coleman (2016) classifies the incommensurability problem as an internal problem, since
—just as the production problem—it would persist even if we did not have any limitation in terms
of the number of types of qualities.
3.2.3. Structures combination problem
The structural aspect of the combination problem is, as with the other aspects, the problem of
explaining  how  the  structure  of  microexperience  can  give  rise  to  the  structures  of  the
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macroexperience. At first, this question might not seem problematic, since we already deal pretty
well with the combination of microphysical structures into macrophysical structures. 
However, there are two versions of this problem that need to be addressed by any successful
panpsychist theory. The first is what Chalmers  (2016) calls the  structural mismatch problem. He
says:
Macrophysical structure (in the brain, say) seems entirely different from the macrophenomenal
structure we experience.  Microexperiences presumably have structure closely corresponding to
microphysical  structure (this is  especially clear on a Russellian view), and we might expect a
combination of them to yield something akin to macrophysical structure. How do these combine to
yield macrophenomenal structure instead? (2016, 183)
As we can see from the quote above, the structural mismatch problem is tied to the idea of a
correspondence between the microphysical and the microexperiential structures. Just as in the case
of the palette problem, that is why Coleman (2016) classifies this as a bridging problem. It is also
why  this  problem is  particularly  pressing  for  the  Russellian  panpsychist  view.  Chalmers  says:
“Although the structural mismatch argument has received relatively little attention to date, I think it
is one of the more powerful arguments against constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism and
panprotopsychism” (Chalmers 2016, 191).
The second version of the structural aspect of the combination problem is the grain problem,
and it  has been discussed both as a general objection to physicalism  (Lockwood and Robinson
1993) as well as a specific objection to panpsychism (Goff 2006). In the context of panpsychism, it
can be understood as the problem of explaining how an array of  discontinuous microexperiences
can give rise to a seemingly continuous macroexperience. 
Chalmers  (2016,  sec.  7.4.6) discusses  the  grain  problem relating  it  to  what  he  calls  the
revelation argument. He points out the problem that, if the nature of consciousness is revealed to us
by  introspection,  such  nature  does  not  seem to  be  a  vast  array  of  microexperiences.  Instead,
consciousness under introspection seems to be ‘smooth’ in a continuous macroexperience. Coleman
(2016) considers the grain problem to be an internal equivalent of the structural mismatch problem,
since it is a problem that does not require any tie between phenomenal and physical structures.
4. A holarchical solution to the combination problem
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the combination problem has been the focal point of
most of contemporary debate surrounding panpsychism. There is, however, a possible solution that I
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believe has been largely ignored, which is the one discussed by philosopher Ken Wilber  (2001;
2000b). Skrbina (2005) says that Wilber belongs to one of the five viable contemporary approaches
to panpsychism, that of  part-whole holarchy. He also says that “Wilber takes the basic system of
Cardano/Koestler and marries it with elements of Teilhard, Plotinus, Spinoza, process philosophy,
and various Eastern philosophers, producing an ontology which is explicitly panpsychist” (Skrbina
2005, 220).
Besides the possibility of not being that well known, there are two other reasons that could
help explain why Wilber’s solution has not been given much attention. The first one is that his body
of work is large and his philosophy covers many different areas of knowledge, as his main goal is
an explicit attempt at giving rise to the integration of as many fields as he can. Because of this, even
though a version of panpsychism is a fundamental part of Wilber’s ontology, it is not always the
entry point for his discussions. Therefore, even among those who know about him it might be that
his ideas about panpsychism are taken as a background.
The second reason is that, even though Wilber does discuss his version of panpsychism at
some length, the discussion about the combination problem is much more restricted. As far as I can
tell, there are only two places where Wilber talks about the combination problem: a long endnote in
his book Integral Psychology, in which he speaks indirectly about it (Wilber 2000b, 176, note 15);
and an addendum in his book  The Eye of Spirit, but one that apparently was only added to later
editions (Wilber 2001, 281). This, together with the first reason, may explain why it has not been
brought into the contemporary discussion almost at all.
What  I  will  do  in  this  chapter  is  to  try  and  explain  how his  views  can  help  solve  the
combination problem. However, those same two reasons create some restrictions. On one hand, I
will  attempt to make the most out of what he explicitly says about the problem. On the other,
because it  is  so limited,  I  will  inevitably have to  make inferences about  questions that are  not
discussed by him. Those inferences will be informed by his other ideas, but because his work is so
broad, it is not clear to what extent Wilber would actually endorse those inferences.
Furthermore, as I discussed in Section 3.2, there are many variations and developments of the
combination problem, and they are among the issues that Wilber never discusses. In those cases, I
will try to expand on his ideas in order to create a coherent picture of how the different versions
could be dealt with based on his theory. This, of course, does not mean that it’s the way Wilber
himself would do it. I will do my best to make it clear what is his direct view on the problem, what
is being inferred from his view on other issues, and what is being expanded by me. But in the end,
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my exposition  will  be  of  a  position  that  is  derivative  of  Wilber’s,  but  in  which  the  limits  of
originality are recognized as unclear.
4.1. Ken Wilber’s panpsychism
In order to discuss Wilber’s solution to the combination problem, we need to first understand
some fundamental ideas of his philosophy. In particular, it is important to know about his ontology
based on holons, how he relates subjectivity and objectivity, and how his panpsychism is different
from other versions.
4.1.1. Holons and holarchy
A holon is a whole that is also a part. For example, a whole atom is a part of a molecule, and a
whole molecule is a part of a cell. Atoms and molecules are both holons. This is a concept that
comes from Arthur Koestler (1967), and one that Wilber uses as the basis for his ontology:
Reality as a whole is not composed of things or processes, but of holons. Composed, that is, of
wholes that are simultaneously parts of other wholes, with no upward or downward limit. To say
that holons are processes instead of things is in some ways true, but misses the essential point that
processes themselves exist only within other processes. There are no things or processes, only
holons. (Wilber 2000a, 43)
This is, at the same time, an intuitive but also radical view of the world. In the example I gave
above,  I  talked about  how atoms and molecules are  holons.  But in  a sense,  this  is  misleading,
because it might seem as if holons are just a general name for the same physical entities we already
had  for  example  in  a  physicalist  view.  But  Wilber  is  actually  trying  to  avoid  views  such  as
physicalism,  idealism and dualism,  which is  why he ends up in  a  type of  panpsychism.  He is
explicit about that, saying: “This approach also undercuts the argument between the materialist and
idealist camps. Reality isn’t composed of quarks, or bootstrapping hadrons, or subatomic exchange;
but neither is it composed of ideas, symbols, or thoughts. It is composed of holons” (Wilber 2000a,
43).
For the sake of simplicity, I will continue to use the physical entities as example of holons.
But these should always be taken with the caveat that the basic feature of Wilber’s ontology are
holons, not physical entities.
Furthermore, holons are wholes that are part of holons, and not just wholes or parts. As Wilber
puts it, “there are no wholes, and there are no parts. There are only whole/parts” (Wilber 2000a, 43).
This has a nesting effect, where you get a hierarchy of holons, that is, a  holarchy. And since all
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holons are both wholes and parts, the nesting goes all the way up and all the way down7 (Wilber
2000a, 47). The importance of this will become clearer when we discuss how it helps solve the
combination problem.
4.1.2. Interiors and exteriors
In Wilber’s theory, holons have four fundamental aspects that can not be reduced to each
other, which he calls quadrants. These aspects are the result of two axes of differentiation, one of
which is the interior-exterior axis, and the other the individual-collective axis. Combining these, we
would have the four quadrants: the interior of the individual, the exterior of the individual, the
interior of the collective and the exterior of the collective. To Wilber, these differentiations are close
to a metaphysical necessity, because you can’t have the concept of an interior without an exterior,
nor of an individual without a collective (Wilber 2000a, chap. 4; 2000b, chap. 5).
For now, we can focus on the interior-exterior distinction for the individual, which is the most
relevant for the discussion at hand. This division can be roughly equated—but not completely, as we
will see—with the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, or between what is seen in a first
person perspective and in a third person perspective.
4.1.3. Panpsychism or pan-depthism
Now, since for Wilber holons go all the way down, and every holon has both an interior and
an exterior, the obvious conclusion is that interiors go all the way down, i.e., panpsychism. Wilber
embraces the implication, but he prefers not to call his view panpsychism:
For  me,  consciousness  in  the  broad  sense  is  ultimately  unqualifiable  (Emptiness),  and  thus,
although interiors go all the way down, no type of interior does. I am a pan-interiorist, not a pan-
experientialist,  pan-mentalist,  pan-feelingist,  or  pan-soulist.  The  forms  of  the  interior  show
developmental  unfolding:  from a  fuzzy  something-or-other  […]  to  prehension  to  sensation  to
perception to impulse to image to concept to rules to rationality and so forth, but none of those go
all the way down in one specific form. (Wilber 2000b, 276)
Skrbina  (2005,  221) says  that  Wilber  misunderstands  what  is  the  common  view  of
panpsychism when he says things like “the common panpsychism view [...] is that, for example,
rocks have feelings or even souls, which is untenable” (Wilber 2000b, 280). On one hand, we can
take at face value that Skrbina is correct in saying that this is not the common view of panpsychism,
7 Although to our purposes the most important direction is ‘all the way down’, the ‘all the way up’ direction can lead
to some interesting connections and implications to other views such as cosmopsychism, as well to philosophical
questions in fields such as logic.
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and that maybe Wilber mischaracterizes it. On the other, Wilber seems to be saying two different
things at the same time, both of which are more relevant to the discussion. 
The first thing is part of the difficulties of panpsychism, and one that I mentioned earlier
(Section 2.2): establishing which are the systems that do possess consciousness. The definition of
panpsychism that Skrbina himself gives, as I also discussed in Section  2.2, is very open in this
regard, saying that “a functional definition of panpsychism might be ‘All objects, or systems of
objects, possess a singular inner experience of the world around them.’” (2005, 16). 
But regardless of whether that is the common view of panpsychism or not, Wilber is clear
when  he  says  that  such  broad  definition  does  not  apply  even  if  we  use  his  understanding  of
interiors: “Rocks as heaps have no interiors (there is the inside of a rock, but that is just more
exteriors); rocks, however, do contain atoms, which are holons, and those holons have one of the
very lowest types of interiors” (Wilber 2000b, 280).  The implication is that rocks are not holons,
and that is why they do not have interiors. 
This, in turn, raises the important question of how and when do we get a new holon, which is
basically the same problem I mentioned previously about how ‘pan’ we want our panpsychism to
be. How do we establish which systems are holons and, as a consequence, conscious? I will call this
the  holon generation problem.  It  is  not strictly  the combination problem, but it  is  very closely
related to it. Skrbina says that “Wilber [...] draws the burden of explaining just how and when an
interior appears in, say, a molecule of salt when one does not exist in the Na and Cl pair just before
bonding, or, for that matter, how a new interior of a brain is created from the union of independent
interiors of the neurons”  (Skrbina 2005, 221). Part of my goal for this chapter is to discuss how
Wilber’s view could deal with this issue.
The second thing Wilber seems to be saying is related to how he understands consciousness in
the broadest sense:
What most panpsychists mean by consciousness or mind is  not what I mean by consciousness,
which is depth. Because consciousness is depth, it is itself literally unqualifiable. It is depth, not
any particular, qualifiable level of depth (such as sensation or impulse or perception or intention)
—those are all forms of consciousness, not consciousness as such. In other words, depth isn’t a
quality, like sensation or impulse or idea, but a relationship (or opening) among holons. […] I am a
pan-depthist, not a pan-psychist, since the psyche itself emerges only at a particular level of depth.
(Wilber 2000a, 567, chapter 4, note 2, emphasis original)
Here, Wilber uses the notion of depth to describe consciousness, which is why he describes
himself as a pan-depthist. Because a holon is a whole/part that is composed of other holons, each
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holon has a depth associated with it, in terms of ‘how many’ layers it contains. The point is not to
say that each holon has a specific number of layers, but only that each holon has layers and, because
of that, it has depth. As Wilber says in the quote above, depth is a relationship among holons and, as
a consequence, so is consciousness.
In  the  earlier  quote,  Wilber  also  describes  himself  as  a  pan-interiorist.  The  relationship
between depth and interiors is not perfectly clear. It seems to relate to an idea alluded in the quote
above,  where  depth  is  an  opening  among  holons.  Wilber  says  that  “interiors  are  ultimately
unqualifiable (in my view, every interior is basically an opening or clearing in which correlative
exteriors arise [...])” (Wilber 2000b, 277 italics original). We can say that depth and interiors are at
least very closely related. This is an interesting topic to explore, but it is not strictly necessary for us
at this point of the discussion. We now have enough to go to the combination problem.
4.2. Solving the combination problem
So  far,  I  have  discussed  some  of  Wilber’s  ideas  that  we  need  in  order  to  tackle  the
combination  problem.  Recapitulating:  (1)  reality  is  made  of  holons,  which  are  whole/parts
composed of other holons; (2) holons have interiors and exteriors, where interiors are seen from ‘the
inside’ and exteriors from ‘the outside’; (3) interiors (and holons) go all the way down, but no
specific type of interior does; (4) consciousness or depth is a relationship among holons.
4.2.1. Setting the stage
Just for the sake of clarity, I am going to introduce a simple notation to talk about different
aspects of different holons. It might seem an unnecessary complication at first, but I believe it will
help make Wilber’s solution clearer and more precise. I will represent a holon by H. Each holon has
an interior  (I)  and an exterior  (E).  Since we are  focusing on interiors,  we can  make a  further
distinction within this context, between a subject (S) and an object (O) of experience.
Notice that I am slipping in the word ‘experience’ here, despite the fact that Wilber explicitly
rejects the label of pan-experientialism. This is because in his view even experience could be taken
as a form of interior and, as stated above, no form of interior goes all the way down. I will still use
the word, however, because I believe it also might contribute to the clarity of the explanation. 
There is also a subtle issue with the word ‘object’ here. The qualitative aspect of experience is
at the core of the hard problem of consciousness, and what panpsychism attempts to deal with in the
first place. What is given in the experience of a subject are those qualitative aspects, which here are
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equivalent to what I’m calling the object of experience. Therefore, here the word ‘object’ is taken as
having the most  basic  and fundamental  meaning,  that  is,  as  the  counterpart  to  the ‘subject’ of
experience.
As a further notation, I will add a number representing the depth of the holon. For example
H2 is a holon of depth 2, which means it is composed of holons of depth 1, that is, of holons H1.
The  number  is  not  supposed  to  mean  anything  in  particular,  it  is  just  a  way  of  making  the
distinctions clear when we talk about holons at different levels of depth. I will do the same for the
other aspects. For example, a holon H1 has an interior I1 and an exterior E1. And within the context
of an interior I1, we have a subject S1 and an object O1 of experience.
4.2.2. Reinterpreting the problem
Now, recall that there are multiple versions of the combination problem. Putting in terms of
holons, we have multiple holons at one level, let’s say H1, that compose a holon at a higher level,
H2. Looking from the outside, we could have for example that holons of the type H1 are atoms, and
that they form a molecule as a holon H2. The combination problem in general is about relating the
respective multiple interiors I1 to the interior I2.
But specifically, the combination problem with regards to subjects could be interpreted as the
problem of explaining how the combination of multiple subjects S1 could lead to a subject S2. In
turn, the combination problem with regards to qualities is explaining how the qualities of one level
combine into the qualities of the level above it. Since here I am taking the qualities as equivalent to
the objects of experience, it could be interpreted as the problem of explaining the combination of
multiple  O1 into O2.  However,  as  I’ll  discuss  in  the next  section,  this  way of interpreting the
combination problem is the core issue that creates the problem in the first place, and what Wilber’s
theory tries to change.
4.2.3. Subject layering, not subject summing
Here is where the uniqueness of Wilber’s solution comes into play, which he attributes to have
its origin in developmental psychology and process philosophy. The solution to the combination
problem is to change the way subjects and objects of different levels of depth relate to each other.
Multiple H1 compose a H2, but multiple S1 do not combine to compose S2. Instead, the multiple
S1 are objects for S2. That is, S1 has to be understood in terms of O2. In Wilber’s words:
the combination problem is actually something that has been successfully handled (on the relative
plane) for quite some time by developmental psychology and Whiteheadian process philosophy. In
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essence, with each wave of development, the subject of one stage [i.e., level of depth] becomes an
object of the next (as Robert Kegan would put it), so that each stage is a prehensive unification of
all of its predecessors (Wilber 2001, 283)
The essential phrase is this: “the subject of one stage [i.e., level of depth] becomes the object
of the next”. Throughout the whole discussion about the combination problem we have been trying
to think about how subjects combine into subjects or how qualities combine into qualities.  Some
philosophers such as Coleman (2012; 2014; 2016) have defended that we could get macrosubjects
directly out of microqualities, without appealing to microsubjects, but that would require a deflation
of subjects.
Wilber’s solution, in contrast, keep both subjects and qualities at the macro and the micro
level, but changes how they relate to each other. We need to remember that, for him, consciousness
is a relation among holons. A holon H2 is conscious of its H1 parts, but in a chained manner. The
subject S1 is an object of consciousness to S2. Again, the composition relation is held between
holons, not between subjects nor between qualities. When multiple H2 combine to form a further
holon H3, the same thing happens. S1 is an object for S2, which in turn is now an object for S3.
Each holon keeps its subject, it’s just that this subject becomes an object for a larger holon.
As ingenious as this idea is, there are still many questions to be dealt with. This is where I
have to start making significant inferences about Wilber’s solution. I want to make it perfectly clear
that what follows is mostly my application of Wilber’s solution, supported by some of his other
ideas. Wilber himself does not seem to address any of the specific combination problems, but only a
general version as in the context of the quote I gave earlier. I think that his solution is broad enough
to be able to encompass all the specific problems, and I am happy to give him due credit for it. But
my intention is to try and expand his solution more explicitly, since he does not do so himself.
First, I have tried to be careful with singulars and plurals, but there is here a question of how
multiple subjects of one level become a single object for a single subject of the level above. Wilber
does not seem to explain exactly how this works, but the quote I gave earlier seems to give us an
idea: “the subject of one stage [i.e. level of depth] becomes an object of the next (as Robert Kegan
would put it), so that each stage is a prehensive unification of all of its predecessors” (Wilber 2001,
283, emphasis mine).  This indicates that it  would be the subject itself  that unifies the multiple
objects.
A single subject has a single unified experience, and that experience is a single object only in
a broadest sense. Maybe it is possible that a subject could have the unified experience of multiple
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objects without those objects having to be further unified into a single object. In fact, this possibility
makes sense in this context, because the unification into a single object would actually happen at a
further level above. For example, if multiple S1 are objects in an unified experience of S2, then they
become a unified object when S2 itself becomes an object for S3. This also means that, at this point,
the distinction between S2, O2 and I2 changes. That is because S2 an O2 are not different parts of
I2, but S2 is I2 in relation to I1. And O2 is simply S1 in relation to S2. In other words, S2 is I2 as it
“looks downwards”.
Second, there are still  the questions raised by each different variation of the combination
problem that I discussed earlier (Section 3.2). One of them is the subject summing problem, which
is the problem of how subjects could sum into a further subject. In this solution, however, we are
not summing the subjects. Maybe one could say that holons are “summed” into other holons—
although that also could be problematic—, but no subject is being summed here. Under Coleman’s
classification  this  is  an  internal  problem about  how  our  concept  of  subject  could  lead  to  the
constitution of another subject. But Wilber’s solution entails changing the concept of a subject in
relation to the subjects of its parts, which is why he bypasses the issue.
One interesting thing to think about is related to what I have already quoted from William
James when he talks about summing subjects: “still each remains the same feeling it always was,
shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean” (James 1890,
160).  This  idea of  a  subject  shut  in  its  own skin,  windowless,  brings  up nicely the  feature of
Wilber’s proposal. If we have a subject S3 who experiences S2 as an object, what is it that S3 sees?
Because H2 is composed of H1, S2 is experiencing S1. So S3 experiences S2 experiencing S1. S2 is
still shut in its own skin, but now S3 sees ‘through’ it, and that includes S1. So S2 is windowless
insofar H2 is seen from the outside. But when H2 becomes part of H3, S2 actually becomes a
window through which S3 can see S1, as S1 is an object for S2.
Still, Coleman puts the subject summing as form of explanatory gap, because we don’t have
an  entailment  from  microsubjects  to  macrosubjects.  This  is  closely  related  to  the  issue  of
conceivability: we can conceive of microsubjects without the existence of a further macrosubject.
But this works differently under this holarchical solution. Let us sketch a simple argument. Take
these premises: (1) the subject of a level is experienced as an object for the subject of a level above;
(2) S1 is the subject within a holon H1, as S2 is within H2; (3) holons H1 compose a holon H2.
Conclusion: S1 is experienced as an object for S2. 
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Premises (1) and (2) are part of Wilber’s conceptual framework. These, of course, can be
questioned. But the issue at hand is to deal with what Coleman called the internal problem of the
subject summing, which is a conceptual issue that gives rise to an explanatory gap. Therefore, (1)
and  (2)  can  be  taken simply  as  the  necessary  conceptual  framework to  solve  the  combination
problem.
What remains as a possible problem is premise (3). Even if we accept Wilber’s conceptual
framework, there is sill the question of how and when holons give rise to new holons, what I called
the holon generation problem earlier, in Section 4.1.3. Maybe we can have a bunch of holons H1
come together and never compose a new holon H2, which would lead to a different conceivability
problem. This is the same issue I touched upon previously of establishing which are the systems
that are conscious, if we do not want to attribute consciousness to every possible system, and this
again is tied to the holon generation problem. I will discuss this issue in more detail later, but here it
is enough to notice that previously we had two problems: one about subject summing and one about
which systems are conscious. Under Wilber’s conceptual framework, the first problem collapses
into the second, which means that now we have one fewer problem.
Another version of the combination problem regarding subjects is  the unity one.  Quoting
Coleman  again:  “How could  you  hope  to  produce  a  phenomenally  unified,  single-perspective,
subject  by assembling a  group of  subjects  each of  which essentially  has  its  own perspective?”
(Coleman 2016, 255). This problem is dealt with in a similar way to what we have been discussing
so far. The way to unify multiple subjects, each with its own perspective, is to make them objects of
experience  for  a  further  subject.  This  further  subject  is  tied  to  the  corresponding  holon,  and
therefore this problem too collapses into the holon generation problem.
Next on our list is what Chalmers  (2016) calls the boundary problem and Roelofs  (2019)
relates to  the incompatibility contexts argument.  The boundary problem is  the problem of how
boundaries of wholes and parts relate, since each subject seems to have boundaries around its own
experience.  The incompatibility contexts argument is a dilemma between saying that either: (1)
parts  lose their  boundaries and have the same experience as the whole; or (2) parts  keep their
boundaries, which means the experiences that the whole inherits from the parts is not the same as
the parts experience them.
Once again, this problem is solved in Wilber’s account by the relation between subjects of
different levels. In a sense, Wilber chooses option (2) of Roelof’s dilemma, because each holon and
the corresponding subject keeps its boundaries. But that is not a problem because, as I said before,
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when H1 composes H2 which composes H3, we have that S3 experiences S1 through S2. Which
means that  each subject  gets  to keep its  boundaries  at  the same time as  its  experience is  seen
through by the subject of the level above it.  As Wilber puts it,  “at every stage ‘a single self is
composed of many selves’” (Wilber 2000b, 281).
The last of the combination problems related to subjects is the privacy argument. This is the
problem of explaining how a private subjective experience of a microsubject could at the same time
be accessed by a macrosubject. As might seem clear at this point, the response also lies in how S3
experiences S2 experiencing S1. The experience of S2 is private in a sense, but at the same time S2
is wholly experienced by S3. That is, S3 experiences S2 as it experiences S1, which means that S3’s
experience includes S1.
4.2.4. Qualities are not pixels
Now we get  to  the  versions  of  the  combination  problem that  are  related  to  phenomenal
qualities. The first of them is the palette problem, which is the problem of explaining how we could
get a huge array of different macroqualities out of a very limited set of microqualities. This is, as
Coleman (2016) says, a bridging problem tied to Russellian versions of panpsychism. I will discuss
later to what extent Wilber’s position can be classified as Russellian, but we can assume it is in
order to work through this problem. So let us say that there is a limited set of intrinsic properties at
a level of holons H1. Any subject S2—that is, at the level of a holon H2—will only be able to see
different combinations of S1, which has a limited set of intrinsic natures. But when we get to a level
above, S3 is no longer limited to the set of S1, because now what S3 can experience is the whole
new set of possible subjects S2. This points to a certain emergent aspect of Wilber’s view, which I
will also discuss later, as it relates to the holon generation problem. But in any case, the fact is that
by  the  time you get  to  holons  of  very  high  levels—humans,  for  example—the  multiplicity  of
qualities to be experienced are no longer a problem.
The second version of the qualities combination problem is the production problem, which is
about  how two  different  qualities  could  in  principle  combine.  This,  in  contrast,  is  an  internal
problem. However, the way it is solved in this context is basically the same as in the previous case.
There  is  no  actual  combination,  because  all  the  different  holons  at  a  level  H1—and  their
corresponding  subjects  S1—retain  their  own  qualities,  subjects  and  boundaries,  as  discussed
previously. Take the case Coleman (2016, 252) discusses of two qualities, red and white, combining
into a pink one. Here, if red and white are ‘qualities’ corresponding to two different holons H1, then
pink could be a quality that corresponds to some level above it, for example H2. In a sense, pink
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could be the quality of the subject S2 while it experiences red S1 and white S1. A pink S2, then,
would be experienced by a further subject S3.
Third, we have incommensurability problem. This is the problem of having qualities that are
general enough so that they could lead to very different modes of experience such as colors, smells
and  pain.  Here,  the  exact  same  solution  as  before  can  be  applied.  Starting  with  fundamental
particles at the bottom, by the time you get to human experiences, the level of depth is very high. So
in the case of an auditory or visual system, for example, the layering of subjects—S1 experienced
by S2 experienced by S3, etc—can be so deep that, even if we start with the same qualities at the
bottom, the overall structure and relation between layers is so dissimilar that we could get to very
different qualities of experience.
4.2.5. Structures from the inside and from the outside
Finally, this is the last group of combination problems, related to the structural aspect. Among
those,  we  have  first  the  structural  mismatch  problem,  which  is  how to  explain  the  difference
between macrophysical structures and macrophenomenal structures. If the microexperiential is tied
to the microphysical, why is it that the corresponding macro structures do not seem to align? The
physical structure of a brain seems very different from the phenomenal structure of what a brain
experiences. This is also a particularly pressing problem under Russellian panpsychism, and as I
discussed earlier (Section 3.2.3), which is why Coleman (2016) classifies it as a bridging problem.
I  will  make use  of  a  somewhat  silly  analogy to  illustrate  how this  can  be  solved under
Wilber’s view. Bear with me. Let us say that on a first level, we have four lenses set up in a row, all
facing down. On a second level, we have a bigger lens on top of the first two of the first level—
covering them completely—and we have another lens on top of the last two of the first level. Then,
on a third level we have an even bigger lens on top of the two lens of the second level, that is,
covering the whole  system.  Now, if  we look at  the  lenses  from the  side,  they form a type of
structure. However, if we look from the top, the structure seems different. That is because when we
look from the side, we are looking at the lenses. But when we look from the top, we are looking
through the lenses. Yes, in a sense we can say that we are also looking at the lenses from the top.
But what we see is changed by the fact that we are now looking through them all, that is, through
their layering.
When we look at a holon H3 from the outside, we see its exterior. That exterior has all the
structural features that include its H2 parts, and their H1 parts in turn. It’s the structure we could
see, for example, by analyzing a cell, which is made of molecules, which are made of atoms. But
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when we look at the interior of H3, we are looking from the inside. More than that,  if we are
looking at the interior of a holon, it means that we are that holon, in this case we are H3—or any
holon above it. And as a subject S3, we are looking at S2, but we are also looking through S2 and
at S1. And that is why the structure we see from the inside is not the same as the one we see from
the outside.
The other version of the combination problem that is related to structure is the grain problem.
This is the problem of explaining why the structure of macroexperience as revealed by introspection
seems  to  be  continuous,  and  not  composed  of  a  multitude  of  discontinuous  microexperiences
instead. This is the same issue as in the revelation argument  (Chalmers 2016, sec. 7.4.6). If we
apply Wilber’s view, this can be solved by using the solution to the previous structural problem, in
addition to what I have discussed about a subject as that which unifies its objects (Section 4.2.3). A
subject S3 experiences a multitude of S2 taken as objects, each in turn experiencing a multitude of
S1 as objects. 
The first thing to notice is that, even though S3 does experience a multitude of S1 in a sense,
it is not in a direct unification of them, but through the intermediate unification given by S2. In the
experience of a human being, we could have many intermediate levels of unification. These would
‘smooth out’ the experience, which means we do not directly experience an uncountable number of
microexperiences,  corresponding  to  all  the  relevant  fundamental  particles.  The  second thing  to
notice is what we discussed for the incommensurability problem, that there seems to be some stark
difference between modes of perception at high levels of macroexperience. Auditory and visual
perceptions are very different, to the point of seeming discrete. But that could be explained by the
fact that the unification between both of them happens at a much higher intermediate level. 
For example, say that a visual experience is built on a layering of holons up to a level H100.
In addition, say that the auditory experience is also built on a layering of holons up to H100, but in a
very different structure from the visual one. Because it took 100 levels of layering to get to both the
full auditory and visual systems, they can be experiences of very different natures. So even if they
are eventually unified under a single experience of a level above, the distinction between them
would  be  very  sharp.  However,  the  distinction  between  the  microexperiences  at  the  level  of
fundamental particles would have been very smoothed out by all the intermediate layers.
4.3. Russellian or not?
As I discussed in Section  2.5.2, Russellian panpsychism is a way to handle the distinction
between  what  matter  is and  what  it  does.  Under  a  Russellian  version  of  panpsychism,
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microexperience takes the role of the intrinsic nature of matter. Now, does this apply to Wilber’s
view? Wilber (2000b) describes the relationship between interiors and exteriors in a way that seems
quite different. As I quoted earlier (Section 4.1.3), he says: “interiors are ultimately unqualifiable (in
my view, every interior is basically an opening or clearing in which correlative exteriors arise [...])”
(Wilber  2000b,  277,  italics  original).  This  does  not  seem  to  be  immediately  about  intrinsic
properties, especially if we consider how he highlights the unqualifiable nature of interiors.
But  if  it  is  the  interiors  that  allow  the  exteriors  to  arise,  then  those  interiors  could  be
understood as playing the role of an intrinsic nature, even if one that is unqualifiable. In forms of
Russellian panpsychism, the intrinsic nature can be seen from within—the phenomenal—, while the
extrinsic nature can be seen from without—the narrowly physical. And this lines up nicely with
Wilber’s concepts of interiors and exteriors, which follows the same pattern. 
In  addition,  regarding  the  relationship  among  holons  in  general,  and  among  subjects  in
particular, Wilber’s conceptual framework also makes sense under a Russellian view. Consider the
following: a subject S1 is seen as an object by a subject S2. But what is it that S2 is actually seeing?
One possible answer could be that what S2 sees is precisely the intrinsic nature of S1. This, again,
makes use of the same conceptual change as before,  because S2 is not seeing its own intrinsic
nature, but that of S1. In this sense, it seems perfectly reasonable to interpret Wilber’s view as being
Russellian, since it fits with other aspects of his theory. 
However,  this  also introduces  a  possible  problem. As I  mentioned earlier  (Section  2.4.1),
many  contemporary  philosophers  (e.g.  Chalmers  2013;  Miller  2018;  Roelofs  2019) focus  on
constitutive Russellian types of panpsychism. That is because these two aspects, ‘constitutive’ and
‘Russellian’, go well together. If the micro level constitute the macro level, then we could say that
the intrinsic nature of the micro level simply is the intrinsic nature of the macro level. But this does
not seem to be applicable to Wilber’s view.
Let us say that there is a holon H3 with its subject S3. Now suppose, given my interpretation
above,  that  what  S3 sees is  not its  own intrinsic  nature,  but  that  of  S2. Likewise,  S2 sees  the
intrinsic nature of S1, and not its own. This seems to imply that S1 and S2 have each their own
distinct intrinsic nature. But just as H3 is composed of H2, we have that H2 is composed of H1. So
how come we get two distinct intrinsic natures in S1 and S2? In order to get two intrinsic natures
under  the  same holon,  we would  need  some form of  strong emergence.  It  is  this  question  of
emergence in  Wilber’s  view that  I  will  discuss  in  the next  section,  under  the holon generation
problem.
40 / 55
4.4. The holon generation problem: constitutive or not?
Recall  that  constitutive  panpsychism  is  the  view  that  microexperiences  constitute
macroexperiences, and it is usually contrasted with emergent panpsychism. Wilber’s view brings a
conceptual change—subjects of one level become objects for subject of the next level—, which is
what makes possible the discussed solution to the combination problem. On one hand, this means
that  it  would not  be correct  to interpret  his  view as a constitutive form of panpsychism, since
microexperiences are not constituting macroexperiences. On the other hand, the same shift  also
blocks us from saying that macroexperiences emerge out of microexperiences. This is because we
get macro holons out of micro holons, not macroexperiences out of microexperiences, as I will
explain.
What is possible, however, is to use these terms to discuss the relation between holons at
different levels, in what I have been calling the holon generation problem. A holon H2 is composed
of holons H1, but is this a relation of constitution or of emergence? From what I have been hinting
at  different  points,  it  seems  that  Wilber’s  view requires  some form of  emergence,  and  that  is
precisely the position that he takes:
[...]  holons emerge. First subatomic particles,  then atoms, then molecules,  then polymers,  then
cells, and so on. The emergent holons are in some sense novel; they posses properties and qualities
that cannot be strictly and totally deduced from their components; and therefore they, and their
descriptions, cannot be reduced without remainder to their component parts. (Wilber 2000a, 54)
There are a couple of things that need to be noticed here. First, under non-Russellian—i.e.
dualist—forms of emergent panpsychism, microphenomenal and microphysical properties run in
parallel,  which  then  raises  the  question  of  how the  emergent  macrophenomenal  relates  to  the
macrophysical.
But in Wilber’s position this is not a problem. As I said, we do not have an emergence of
macrophenomenal out of microphenomenal; nor do we have an emergence of macrophysical out of
microphysical. What we have in Wilber’s view is the emergence of macro holons out of micro
holons. The phenomenal and the physical are seen as the interior and the exterior of holons. And the
relation between interiors and exteriors is the same regardless of the level of the holon, so there is
no separate emergence of macrophenomenal and macrophysical. Therefore, I think that Wilber’s
position could be considered as closer to a Russellian form of emergent panpsychism—and not a
dualist one—, as long as we keep in mind the considerations I discussed in the previous section.
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One of the possible problems with the move to emergent panpsychism is that it  needs to
appeal to a stronger type of emergence. This is in contrast to constitutive panpsychism, which only
requires  a  weak  type  of  emergence.  The  use  of  strong  emergence,  however,  could  erode  the
argument  that  lead  us  to  panpsychism in  the  first  place.  If  we  are  going  to  appeal  to  strong
emergence,  why  not  choose  emergent  dualism  instead,  and  get  consciousness  out  of  non-
consciousness? Brüntrup (2016, sec. 2.4), discusses this issue, saying that while this might seem to
reduce the theoretical  elegance of panpsychism, it  does not necessarily mean that it  defeats  its
purpose.  He says: “The key question,  of course,  is which notion of strong emergence the non-
constitutive [i.e.  emergent]  panpsychist  will  employ.  Even strong emergence comes in different
flavors” (Brüntrup 2016, 65).
The  distinction  among  different  flavors  of  strong  emergence  could  give  emergent
panpsychism an advantage when compared to emergent dualism. With emergent dualism we get
consciousness out of non-consciousness; with emergent panpsychism, we get macroconsciousness
out of microconsciousness. So even if the emergent macroconsciousness has something truly above
and  beyond  its  microconscious  parts,  it  seems  like  a  shorter  leap  than  what  Strawson  (2006)
considers the brute emergence of getting the conscious out of the non-conscious. 
Wilber’s view, in turn, has a similar advantage over emergent dualism, even if we have a
strong emergence of holons. Besides, his position also has the advantage of being able to nicely
solve  all  of  the  combination  problems  under  a  single  conceptual  framework,  as  I  discussed.
Appealing to emergence gives us the possibility of new holons, and allows us to solve some of the
difficulties we were facing. However, it also creates new problems, as I will discuss next.
4.4.1. Causal efficacy and causal closure
When I discussed the argument for panpsychism (Section 2.4.2), it included the supposition of
the  causal  efficacy  of  consciousness,  that  is,  that  we  should  consider  consciousness  as  being
causally relevant. One of the advantages of constitutive Russellian versions of panpsychism is that
it is able to give some explanation of how macroconsciousness could be causally relevant. Since
Russellian panpsychism takes microconsciousness to be the intrinsic nature of matter, by definition
it is the very reason why matter is causally relevant. What matter does in terms of causal efficacy, is
due  to  what  matter  is,  i.e.,  its  intrinsic  nature..  And  for  constitutive  panpsychism  the
macroconsciousness is constituted of microconsciousness, so one could argue that having causal
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efficacy  in  microconsciousness  would  be  enough  to  attribute  causal  efficacy  to
macroconsciousness8.
But there is another important question here, one about causal closure.  I discussed earlier
(Section 2.4.1) that in his defense of panpsychism, Chalmers (2013) uses a causal argument against
dualism and in favor of physicalism as its antithesis. One of the premises of the causal argument is
about the causal closure of physics: everything that is causally relevant for a physical event can be
fully explained in physical terms. Of course, Chalmers uses this to get to panpsychism, so the idea
that consciousness could be explained in physical terms is rejected. But remember that there is a
distinction between the narrowly physical and the broadly physical, and only the narrowly physical
can  be described in  physical  terms.  So the  causal  closure of  physics  is  in  fact  what  Chalmers
(Chalmers 2013, 14) calls the causal closure of the narrowly physical. But there still remains the
question of causal closure of the broadly physical.
The causal closure of the broadly physical is the idea that everything that is causally relevant
for a broadly physical event is also broadly physical, regardless of whether it can be described by
physics  or  not.  But  within  the  broadly  physical,  we can make a  further  distinction:  the causal
closure  of  the  broadly  microphysical.  Since  the  broadly  microphysical  would  include  both  the
microphysical—as in narrowly microphysical—as well as the microphenomenal, I will simply call
this the causal closure of the micro. Goff describes a similar idea: “Micro-level causal closure is the
thesis  that  everything that  happens has  a  sufficient  micro-level  cause”  (Goff  2007,  11).  I  will,
however, use the concept of ‘causal closure of the micro’ in a slightly different way, but that in the
end serves the same purpose.
Notice that Goff says that the idea is that micro-level causes are sufficient for everything that
happens. This means that it is sufficient for everything that happens at both the micro-level and the
macro-level. But I want to define the causal closure of the micro more strictly: the causal closure of
the micro is the idea that everything that is causally relevant for the micro-level is also at the micro-
level.
If we take the macro-level to be nothing but the micro-level—as in constitutive panpsychism
—, then this is not a problem and both definitions are equivalent. But under Wilber’s view, we are
considering  holons  at  the  macro-level  as  something that  newly  emerges  and is  not  completely
8 On one hand, this view could be accused of being too deflationary about the causal efficacy of macroconsciousness,
since it would be nothing above the causal efficacy of microconsciousness itself. On the other hand, it lines up with
the intuition of how the causal efficacy of a macrophysical entity such as a hammer could be understood as nothing
above the causal efficacy of its parts.
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reducible to the holons at the micro-level. And at the same time, we are want the holons at the
macro-level to have causal efficacy.
But these two ideas seem to be in conflict: (1) causal closure of the micro-level; (2) non-
reducible causal relevance of the macro-level. If (1) is correct then there seems to be no role for any
causal relevance as described by (2). How could the macro-level affect the micro-level, if there is
causal closure at the micro-level? Maybe we could say that the causal relevance of the macro-level
is limited to the macro-level itself, and therefore is independent of the micro-level. But this would
simply lead us back to some form of emergent dualism, which we are trying to avoid. If we want
micro and macro levels to be both causally relevant, while remaining ‘on the same side’ of the
ontology, then we need a way to make sense of their causal relation. This question connects in
general to the holon generation problem, but also specifically to the problem of establishing which
systems are conscious and which are not. I will discuss this question in the next section.
4.4.2. Individual and collective: which systems are conscious?
At the beginning of this chapter I mentioned how Wilber has the idea of four quadrants, which
are the result of distinctions made in two axes: interior-exterior and individual-collective. So far we
have been focusing on holons as individuals, and dealing with the combination problem in those
terms. But the individual is just one side of the axis. At this point, it is important to consider how
the individual and the collective relate, because it has direct implications in the questions of holon
generation, of causal efficacy and of which systems are conscious. However, to discuss the relation
between individual and collective in depth could by itself fill a whole dissertation. I will, therefore,
focus only on the aspects that are relevant for our purposes. 
Wilber talks about individual holons and social holons, but not as a sharp distinction:
This distinction between an individual holon and its social holon (environment in the broadest
sense) is not as easy to draw as it may first appear, however, because it’s almost impossible to
define what we mean by an individual in the first place. […] On the other hand, we do recognize
that  enduring  holons  possess  a  specific  form  or  pattern,  and  this  pattern  is  to  some  degree
autonomous,  or  resistant  to  environmental  obliteration.  And this  is  usually  what  we mean by
calling a holon an “individual”—we mean an enduring compound individual, compounded of its
junior holons and adding its own defining form or wholeness (Wilber 2000a, 72 italics original)
If we take atoms as individual holons, then a group of atoms can be seen as a social holon at
that  level.  Of  course,  ‘social’ here  does  not  mean  ‘human  social’,  but  just  as  a  collective  of
individuals.  However,  when two atoms come together  and form a  molecule,  for  example,  that
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molecule can now be understood as an individual holon, because it has a pattern that endures. But if
both the individual and the social are holons, and we have been talking about panpsychism in terms
of holons, would that mean that social holons are also conscious? Wilber says they are not:
I  agree  entirely  with  Leibniz/Whitehead/Hartshorne/Griffin  that  only  the  entities  known  as
compound individuals (i.e.,  holons) possess a  characteristic interior.  Holons are different  from
mere heaps or aggregates, in that the former possess actual wholeness (identifiable pattern, agency,
regime, etc.). [...] Heaps, on the other hand, are holons that are accidentally thrown together (e.g., a
pile of sand). Holons have agency and interiors (every whole is a part, and thus every holon has an
interior and an exterior), whereas heaps do not. A social holon stands between the two: it is more
than a heap, in that its individuals are united by patterns of relational exchange, but it is less than
an individual holon in terms of the tightness of its regime: social holons do not possess a locus of
self-awareness […]. (Wilber 2000b, 279)
In this quote Wilber is not always explicit, but it seems clear enough that he is talking about
holons as individual holons, in contrast to social holons and in further contrast to heaps. So it is
only individual  holons that  have a characteristic interior,  i.e.,  are conscious.  According to him,
social holons are not conscious—do not possess a characteristic interior—, even though they are
made up by conscious individuals. But now we can ask: what is it that makes one group of holons a
further conscious entity, while other groups are not? In other words, how is it that a new individual
—which is conscious—emerges out of a collection of holons that was previously a heap or a social
holon? 
This takes us back to Skrbina’s criticism:  “Wilber [...] draws the burden of explaining just
how and when an interior appears in, say, a molecule of salt when one does not exist in the Na and
Cl pair just before bonding, or, for that matter, how a new interior of a brain is created from the
union of independent interiors of the neurons” (Skrbina 2005, 221).
By now we know that for Wilber it is not interiors that emerge out of interiors, but instead
holons that emerge out of holons. Even though we are considering Wilber’s view as somewhat
Russellian—with interiors functioning as intrinsic nature—, he is explicit when saying that there are
no interiors without exteriors, that they co-emerge. So the question is not about how we get new
interiors, but about how we get new individual holons, which are conscious and therefore have
characteristic interiors.
Wilber talks about the emergence of higher holons as being tied to the integration of lower
holons in increasing complexity. He says: “Differentiation produces partness, or a new ‘manyness’;
integration produces wholeness, or a new ‘oneness.’ And since holons are whole/parts, they are
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formed by the joint action of differentiation and integration” (Wilber 2000a, 75). Brüntrup (2016)
takes a similar path9:
If the underlying levels of nature reach a certain threshold of complexity of configuration, then an
emergent individual is likely to appear. The causal properties of the emergent entity will go beyond
the summation of the causal powers at the underlying microlevel. There will be a genuinely new
entity with new causal powers. (Brüntrup 2016, 66)
Here is  the point  that we are able  to  connect the emergence of new individuals with the
problem of causal efficacy. A new individual is distinct not only because it is conscious, but also
because  it  gives  rise  to  new  causal  powers,  in  what  is  called  downward  causation.  Having
downward causation, here, means that the new individual has the ability to causally influence its
own parts, a causal influence that is distinct from what the parts themselves already had.
In order  to  deal  with  the  possibility  of  downward causation without  breaking any causal
relation at the micro level—e.g. the laws of physics—, Wilber’s solution is: “The lower sets the
possibilities of the higher; the higher sets the probabilities of the lower”  (Wilber 2000a, 61). He
emphasizes that the causality at higher levels can not break any law governing the lower levels:
even though a higher level “goes beyond” a lower level, it does not violate the laws or the patterns
of the lower level. It cannot be reduced to the lower level; it cannot be determined by the lower
level; but neither can it ignore the lower level. [...] This is what is meant by saying that a lower
sets the possibilities, or the large framework, within which the higher will have to operate, but to
which it is not confined. (Wilber 2000a, 62)
Brüntrup makes a similar point:
If  the  basic  rules  are  indeterministic  such  top-down  influence  might  even  happen  without
‘breaking’ the most fundamental rules, only the probability distribution will be slightly affected.
Such a system is conceptually coherent. If our world were like this, then it would contain strongly
emergent entities with downward causal powers. (Brüntrup 2016, 66)
For that idea to work, we need to have a fit between the philosophical framework and the
empirical restrictions that are given by science in general, and by physics in particular. But there
seems to be room for such views, and one of the common ways of doing so is to appeal to an
9 Funnily enough, both Brüntrup and Wilber use the same quote from Whitehead when discussing these issues: “The
many become one and are increased by one” (Whitehead 1978, 21). This might be a common influence that partly
explain why they get to similar solutions to some of these issues, even though none of the two mention the other, as
far as I am aware. But this adds to what I think is the unfortunate fact that Wilber’s ideas are not being explored in
this context.
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indeterministic  aspect  of  quantum  physics.  Brüntrup  points  to  the  phenomenon  of  quantum
entanglement as such a possibility:
Physics does not know of any viable procedure for reducing the entangled state to a summation of
classical states and hence reducing quantum mechanics to classical physics. But if that is granted,
then the properties of entangled atoms might well be causally efficacious for the future dynamics
of the world. (Brüntrup 2016, 67)
In cases like this,  for  example,  the entangled system of two particles  can not  violate  the
fundamental laws of physics guiding the particle themselves. Each particle has a limited set of
possible states it can be in. However, the probability distributions of the particles depend on the
entangled system as a whole. Again, as Wilber said: “The lower sets the possibilities of the higher;
the higher sets the probabilities of the lower” (Wilber 2000a, 61).
In summary, what we have so far is that, when the complexity increases and you have enough
integration among holons, there comes a point when a new individual holon emerges. That new
individual holon has downward causal powers, which affect the probabilities of the lower level,
without breaking any of the laws governing them. However, this is not a full answer to Skrbina’s
criticism of how Wilber does not explain when it is that a new interior appears. There are two
important considerations to be made.
On one hand, concepts such as ‘complexity’ and ‘integration’ can be vague, and therefore are
able  to  hide  a  more  significant  gap  in  the  explanation.  Therefore,  there  is  plenty  of  room for
refinement in the philosophical discussion about what it means to say that a heap is different from a
social holon, which is different from an individual holon. Wilber himself recognizes that this is a
significant omission in his work (Wilber 2002).
On the other hand, the fact that we are dealing with strong emergence limits to what extent we
can get a full account of the emergent holons, at least in terms of pure philosophical theory. There is
a strong sense in which we can not derive the higher from the knowledge of the lower. This means
that, although we must try to make the philosophical theory more precise, there is still a big part of
the problem that is related to empirical research. What I have discussed about Wilber’s view gives
us a conceptual framework, which in turn can be connected to empirical theories about the specifics
of emergence. On this, Goff says:
if emergent entities have distinctive causal powers, then there will be an empirically discernible
distinction between those systems that have and those systems that  lack such emergent causal
powers.  The behavior  of  the  latter  but  not  the  former will  be predictable on the basis  of  the
behavior of the system’s parts. (Goff 2016, 296)
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One possible source of a connection between these aspects—integration, downward causation
and  empirical  research—,  is  with  the  Integrated  Information  Theory (IIT),  which  is  usually
associated with the work of Giulio Tononi (Hoel, Albantakis, and Tononi 2013; Oizumi, Albantakis,
and Tononi 2014; Tononi and Koch 2015; Tononi et al. 2016). Brüntrup explicitly mentions IIT as
one of the ways to make downward causation to work under panpsychism (Brüntrup 2016, 67), and
Chalmers even classifies IIT itself as a form of emergent panpsychism (Chalmers 2016, 193). In the
next section I will explore a possible relation between IIT and Wilber’s view.
4.5. Integrated Information Theory, externalism and vanishing subjects
IIT is a theory of consciousness that has gained some attention in the last year due not only to
its  attempt  at  a  precise  philosophical  formulation,  but  also  because  of  its  associated  empirical
research. Some of its authors explain:
IIT addresses the hard problem in a new way. It does not start from the brain and ask how it could
give rise to experience; instead, it starts from the essential phenomenal properties of experience, or
axioms, and infers postulates about the characteristics that are required of its physical substrate.
Moreover,  IIT presents  a  mathematical  framework  for  evaluating  the  quality  and  quantity  of
consciousness. (Tononi et al. 2016, 450)
I will not go into the details of the theory, but there are some elements that are interesting to
highlight in the context of our current discussion. The first element is what they mention as the
mathematical  framework  for  evaluating  consciousness.  The  specifics  of  that  framework  has
changed—the theory in its third version (Oizumi, Albantakis, and Tononi 2014)—, but the core idea
is that there is a quantity associated with the level of integration of information, which is denoted by
the Greek letter Φ10. 
Under the right circumstances, the level of integration of information in a system is associated
with the level of consciousness of the system. Those right circumstances are the second element that
is important for us. For IIT, in order to know whether a system is conscious or not, it is not enough
to look at the system itself; we also need to look at all overlapping systems. Only the system with
maximal Φ among all the ones that overlap has a corresponding consciousness associated. This
means, for example, that if we have a system A within a system B within a system C, then system B
is conscious only if neither A nor C has a higher level of integrated information—nor any other
partially or fully overlapping system.
10 There are actually finer distinctions among different quantities in the theory, but for our purposes it is enough to put
all of them under the same name.
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The problem with this view is that it creates a counter-intuitive result: consciousness becomes
an extrinsic property. Whether system B is conscious is determined not just by that which is within
B—e.g. system A—, but also by what lies beyond its limits—e.g. system C. This is a problem that
was briefly pointed out by Chalmers  (2016, 212, note 8), and that has been further discussed by
Mørch (2019). Mørch explains how the problem is mostly a result of one of the postulates of IIT,
the exclusion postulate. This, in turn, is associated with a corresponding exclusion axiom:
Consciousness is exclusive: each experience excludes all others – at any given time there is only
one experience having its full content, rather than a superposition of multiple partial experiences;
each experience has definite borders – certain things can be experienced and others cannot […]
(Oizumi, Albantakis, and Tononi 2014, 3)
This  notion  of  exclusion  means  that,  in  the  example  I  gave  above,  the  consciousness  of
systems A, B and C exclude each other. Only one of them can be conscious. But now let’s say that
initially A had maximal Φ, and was therefore conscious. Then the integration of B increases until it
becomes larger that A’s. Since A is within B, the moment that B becomes conscious, A is no longer
conscious. A was initially a subject, but now it no longer is, even though A has not changed.
The exclusion axiom has some intuitive appeal, since it seems strange to consider that two
overlapping systems could be conscious of some shared experience at the same time. But notice that
this is precisely what I have been discussing under Wilber’s solution to the combination problem.
On one hand, we do not have two subjects having directly the same experience, as I discussed for
the boundary problem, for example. 
On the other  hand,  when an individual  holon H1—a conscious  system—becomes part  of
another individual holon H2, there is no need for H1 to stop being conscious in order for H2 to
become conscious. H1 retains its subjectivity in S1; it is just that S1 is now an object for S2. This is
a direct result of Wilber’s conceptual understanding of consciousness as a relation among holons.
When a higher holon emerges, also does its consciousness. But the lower holons do no lose their
own consciousness; they just enter into a new relation with the higher holon.
It seems to me that IIT can give us some specificity and empirical support to the idea of
integration as leading to the emergence of individual holons, which then have downward causation.
But Wilber’s conceptual framework can provide a better understanding of how holons of lower and
higher levels can relate to each other in terms of consciousness, subjects and experience. With that,
it  can help us  avoid problems such as  the externalism of  IIT, for  example.  I  believe there are
interesting and potentially fruitful paths to be pursued along those lines of inquiry.
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4.6. What lies ahead
I want to close this chapter by discussing some possibilities of how to move forward based on
these ideas. The first possibility is that Wilber’s view could help us solve what Chalmers  (2018)
recently called the meta-problem of consciousness. Chalmers explains:
The meta-problem proper, however, is the problem of explaining problem intuitions: intuitions that
reflect our sense that there is some sort of special problem involving consciousness, and especially
some sort of gap between physical processes and consciousness. For example, ‘I can’t see how
consciousness could be physical’ is a problem report, and the disposition to judge and report this is
a problem intuition. (Chalmers 2018, 12)
 In  other  words,  the  meta-problem is  about  understanding  why  we  think  that  there  is  a
problem of consciousness in the first  place. I believe that Wilber’s ideas—e.g., that subjects of
consciousness are not summed, but layered—can provide some insights around this question. One
way of approaching the meta-problem could be by investigating how it is that we can take both first
and third person perspectives. This can be helpful because the hard problem of consciousness is tied
to the tension between these perspectives. And it seems that any theory of consciousness should at
least  help explain them, since they are perspectives that are taken by conscious beings such as
ourselves. 
Wilber connects much of his theory to developmental psychology, where there is a lot of
theoretical and empirical work regarding the development of perspectives, in both children and
adults. So let us consider the possibility, for example, that when we develop as complex holons we
gain more and more depth, and with each level of depth there are new capacities. If taking a first
and a third person perspective are capacities that we gain at some level of complexity, then it is
conceivable that, with more complexity, there comes a point when we are able to see how those
perspective are at odds with each other. It is important to notice that I am not talking about having
interiors or exteriors, since those are present at any level. I am talking about the cognitive capacity
of taking those perspectives.
Chalmers  (2018) talks about distinct categories of intuitions regarding the meta-problem of
consciousness. From those, he says that at the core of the problem are explanatory intuitions, and
closely  related  are  metaphysical  intuitions.  The  former  is  about  the  difficulty  of  connecting
explanations of physical processes with those about consciousness. The latter is about the somewhat
dualistic intuition that consciousness is non-physical, even fundamental. 
50 / 55
One possible way of clarifying such intuitions is by better understanding what it means to take
a  first  and third  person perspective.  This  is  not  part  of  Wilber’s  view,  but  I  believe  that  it  is
compatible.  First,  let  us  define  perspectives  in  the  following  convoluted  way:  a  first  person
perspective is the perspective of which the objects of knowledge are necessarily part of the person
taking  the  perspective;  a  third  person  perspective  is  the  perspective  of  which  the  objects  of
knowledge are not necessarily part of the person taking the perspective. For example, an experience
such as a thought is an object of knowledge—we know about the thought, about the experience—,
one that is revealed in a first person perspective. As an experience and a thought, it is necessarily
part of the person taking the perspective. In contrast, an atom is an object of knowledge—we know
about the atom—, one that is revealed in a third person perspective. The atom is not necessarily part
of the person taking the perspective, since it could be known regardless of being part of that person.
This is a simple definition of first and third person perspectives, but it is one that seems to fit
with our intuitions. But more importantly, it is one that immediately creates an exclusive disjunction
between the two sets of objects of knowledge. Either it will be an object of knowledge of a first
person perspective—necessarily a part of the person—, or it will be an object of knowledge of a
third person perspective—not necessarily part of the person.
If this definition holds, then we can see why we could expect the explanatory intuition of the
meta-problem of consciousness. And if we take a realistic stance towards those objects, then we
also  have  the  metaphysical  intuition,  since  we can  not  see  how the  two types  of  objects—i.e.
consciousness and physical processes—could exist under a single category. 
Now, going back to Wilber, if such capacities of taking first and third person perspectives are
capacities that a holon gets at a certain level of complexity, this means that they are available for the
subject at that level. Now let’s say that the complexity increases even more, and that subject is then
seen as an object for a further subject. Then it could be the case that this further subject sees the
incompatibility between the perspectives. And as the higher subject sees this incompatibility, the
problem of consciousness arises, which is what the meta-problem is asking about.
Besides the meta-problem of consciousness, there is another path that I believe can be further
explored. When Goff  (2016, sec. 11.7) discusses the question of what conditions make it so that
objects combine into a further object, he says that there are two options. The first,  unrestricted
composition, is the idea that any set of objects, no matter how unrelated, compose a further object.
In this case, there is even an object that is composed of: my computer, the moon and Wilber’s left
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toe. The second option, restricted composition, is the idea that some sets of objects form a further
object, while others do not. Goff says:
It  is  likely,  then,  that  the  emergentist  will  support  some  form  of  restricted  phenomenal
composition,  looking  to  the  empirical  facts  for  the  boundary  between  systems  that  are  mere
aggregates of micro-level subjects and systems that are conscious in their own right. (Goff 2016,
296)
There is indeed a sense in which an empirical restricted composition is relevant, as I pointed
out. However, I think that there is the possibility of a hybrid position. I have also discussed how, for
Wilber, there is a distinction between a heap, a social holon and an individual holon, but that those
are not sharp distinctions.  In addition,  I  have briefly  mentioned (Section  4.1.1) that for Wilber
holons go not just all the way down, but also all the way up. Although Wilber does not seem to
speak explicitly in these terms, it seem reasonable to understand that since holons are whole/parts
that go all the way up, then in some sense there is an unrestricted composition of holons. Every
holon it not only a whole, but also a part of another holon. But that holon, in turn, also is a part of
another holon, and so on and so forth.
This does not mean that there would be an unrestricted composition for individual holons—
i.e.,  holons possessing a characteristic interior and downward causal powers. The emergence of
individual holons would still need to be empirically discovered. Instead what we would have is that
holons as such could fall under an unrestricted composition, while individual holons would fall
under a restricted composition.
These considerations are obviously very tentative and speculative. But if the recent rise of
interest in panpsychism has showed us something, it is that initially counter-intuitive ideas can be
very fruitful and worth exploring.
5. Conclusion
Panpsychism is not a single unified theory, but a group of theories. Still, we can define a
coherent general thesis of panpsychism as the view that fundamental entities has some form of
experience. Panpsychism is can be connected to broadly physicalism—everything made of the same
‘stuff’ as tables and chairs—, but rejects narrow physicalism—physics covers all the truths about
reality.  If  to  the rejection of  narrow physicalism we add the rejection of  dualism and of brute
emergence, then get to panpsychism as viable position.
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The  current  biggest  challenge  to  panpsychism  is  the  combination  problem.  This  is  the
problem  of  explaining  how  we  could  get  higher  order  consciousness  out  of  consciousness  at
fundamental entities, even if we assume that panpsychism is true. We can distinguish three aspects
of the combination problem. First, the combination of subjects: it seems difficult to conceptualize
how we could put together a group of microsubjects and get as a result a macrosubject. Second, the
combination of qualities: the qualitative aspect of experience at the human level does is very broad
and complex,  and does  not  seem to be just  a  combination  of  very simple  qualities.  Third,  the
combination of structures:  human consciousness seems to be associated with human brains, but
even if fundamental entities are conscious, the resulting combination into the structure of brains do
not match the structure of experience.
Ken Wilber has proposed a solution to the combination problem that has received little to no
attention, but one that I think has the potential to dealing with all the versions of the problem. In his
view, the world is made of holons, which are wholes/parts. His solution to the combination problem
involves rethinking the way the subjects of lower and higher level holons relate to each other. For
him, the subject of one level becomes the object for the subject of the next level. So indeed subjects
do not combine, but instead they are layered. Wilber’s view require a form o strong emergence, and
this allows higher level holons to gain downward causal powers, which in turn makes consciousness
causally relevant. Despite the fact that strong emergence can lead to problems of causal closure, I
believe there are ways around those problems, and that Wilber’s view should be considered as an
important  step  in  solving  the  combination  problem,  and  ultimately  the  hard  problem  of
consciousness.
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Abstract
The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining the existence of subjective
experience in a world that is purely physical. As the usual theories fail to provide an adequate
explanation,  many  philosophers  started  looking  for  alternatives.  One  of  such  alternatives  is
panpsychism, which has been increasingly gaining attention in the past few decades. Panpsychism
is the view that fundamental entities of the world—fundamental particles, for example—have some
form of very simple consciousness. And, in the theory, it is that spark that allows for the existence
of more complex consciousness, such as in humans.
However,  panpsychism  faces  a  major  difficulty  with  what  is  called  ‘the  combination
problem’. This is the problem that, even if we accept that fundamental entities have some form of
simple consciousness, it is not clear how one could go from a plurality of micro consciousness to a
complex unified macro consciousness.  If we think that an atom is conscious,  for example,  this
seems to imply that it is a subject, a conscious subject. But how do we get to a human subject, with
a complex human brain? It  seems difficult  to understand how putting together  many conscious
subjects—e.g. atoms—could lead to a further conscious subject—e.g. a human.
In this thesis I discuss panpsychism and some of the arguments that support it. In addition, I
explain the combination problem and its different aspects, as well as how it relates to panpsychism
and the hard problem of consciousness. Finally, I discuss a solution to the combination problem that
I believe has not been given proper attention in contemporary philosophy, which is one provided by
the philosopher Ken Wilber. His solution involves changing the conceptual framework of how we
understand the relation between macro and micro subjects. I also apply his theory to the variations
of the combination problem, discussing how we could approach these issues under a single coherent
view.
Thesis word count: 21740.
